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ABSTRACT 
  This Article analyzes the rights of unauthorized migrants and 
elucidates how these noncitizens are incompletely but importantly 
integrated into the U.S. legal system. I examine four topics: (1) state 
and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants, (2) workplace rights 
and remedies, (3) suppression of evidence from an unlawful search or 
seizure, and (4) the right to effective counsel in immigration court. 
  These four inquiries show how unauthorized migrants—though 
unable to assert individual rights as directly as U.S. citizens in the 
same circumstances—can nevertheless assert rights indirectly and 
obliquely by making transsubstantive arguments that fall into five 
general patterns. The first is an institutional competence argument that 
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the wrong decisionmaker acted. The second is an argument that an 
unauthorized migrant was wronged by a comparatively culpable 
person. The third is a citizen proxy argument that sustaining an 
unauthorized migrant’s claim will protect a U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident. The fourth is that an unauthorized migrant may 
be unable to challenge the substance of a decision, yet may mount a 
successful procedural surrogate challenge to the way that decision was 
reached. The fifth is a phantom norm argument that, even if a 
government action withstands constitutional challenge, it violates a 
statute or regulation. 
  These patterns illustrate how typical doctrinal relationships and 
litigation strategies—for example, choosing between equal protection 
and preemption arguments, or between seeking redress for harms to 
individuals and harms to groups—shift significantly for unauthorized 
migrants. These patterns of oblique rights reflect a pervasive national 
ambivalence about immigration outside the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does an unauthorized migrant have rights? What are they? The 
answers to these questions have great practical meaning in the lives of 
over eleven million men, women, and children who live in the United 
States in violation of federal immigration laws.1 The answers also say 
much about how these noncitizens, though their presence in the 
United States is outside the law, are part of U.S. society in important 
and telling ways, particularly as actors in a legal system of rights and 
responsibilities. 
This Article begins, however, by acknowledging that these 
questions may seem odd. A reader trained in the law might even 
think that only an unschooled commentator would pose them, for 
surely the answers begin with the phrase, “it depends.” A few years 
back, a television network asked me to videotape a brief segment. A 
voiceover and graphic would pose a question from a viewer: Do 
immigrants have rights? For exactly sixty seconds, I was on camera to 
give an answer that would fit neatly between shows. There would be 
no editing, so needless to say the shoot required multiple takes. All 
the while, I thought to myself: Who are the immigrants that viewers 
have in mind? What kind of rights are they envisioning? 
So I admit that skepticism about my opening questions is 
reasonable. But I also believe that this inquiry, though nearly 
boundless, is worthwhile. It is axiomatic that unauthorized migrants—
or “undocumented immigrants” or “illegal aliens,” as opposing sides 
of the debate would call them—are here outside the law.2 But by 
 
 1. See MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009, 
at 1 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009. 
pdf (estimating the unauthorized immigrant population living in the United States at 11.6 
million in January 2008); JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A 
PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES app. B at 29 tbl.B1 
(2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (showing a total unauthorized 
immigrant population of 11.9 million in 2008 and providing figures for individual states). 
 2. I use this phrase deliberately as an attempt to be more literally accurate and more 
neutral than “illegal” or “undocumented” immigration. I do not use the phrase to suggest that 
unlawfully present individuals are in a domain in which law is nonexistent or irrelevant. It is a 
construct of the law itself that places them outside the law. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2047–55 (2008) (discussing the meaning of 
“unlawful presence”); see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 1291 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing usage of the terms “illegal aliens,” “undocumented 
aliens,” and “unauthorized migrants”); Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration 
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living and working in the United States, unauthorized migrants are 
part of American society in significant ways, and it turns out that they 
enjoy substantial integration into the overall U.S. legal system. At the 
same time, this integration is incomplete. This Article analyzes how 
and why this is so. 
The core argument of this Article is that the rights of 
unauthorized migrants have evolved in certain patterns that reflect 
various aspects of a pervasive national ambivalence about 
immigration outside the law.3 Because the presence of these 
noncitizens in the United States is literally outside the law, it would 
be dissonant—and arguably inconsistent with some ideas that 
underlie the rule of law—to allow unauthorized migrants to assert 
legal claims as if their presence were lawful. Yet these migrants live as 
part of U.S. society in ways that are not just economically and socially 
important, but also deeply rooted in American history, especially in 
the complex relationship between the United States and Latin 
America. To allow their status as unlawful residents to relegate these 
migrants to legal oblivion would offend other, more fundamental 
ideas that underlie the rule of law.4 And so an uneasy ambivalence 
about immigration outside the law produces ways for unauthorized 
 
Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 18 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 3, 13 
(1997) (discussing how the term “alien” is used to depersonalize unauthorized migrants); Gerald 
L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1440–42 (1995) (analyzing the meaning of the term 
“illegal alien”). 
 3. Soon after the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), Professor Linda Bosniak 
wrote: “Undocumented immigrants live at the boundary of the national membership 
community. They have long occupied a unique, deeply ambivalent place in the United States.” 
Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker 
Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 956. The ambivalence analyzed in Professor 
Bosniak’s foundational piece has evolved into intertwined patterns of oblique rights that I 
examine in this Article. 
 4. See Shortfalls of the 1996 Immigration Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 42 (2007) (statement of Hiroshi Motomura, Kenan 
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (explaining how 
“rule of law” includes not only enforcement, but also discretion subject to legal standards, 
decisionmaking that is based on expertise but subject to checks and balances, and due process); 
Motomura, supra note 2, at 2085–92 (explaining that “rule of law” is a malleable concept that 
can include not just enforcement of the letter of the law, but also recognition of claims to 
equality or membership based on historical relationships and obligations); Hiroshi Motomura, 
The Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 139, 144–51 (2008) 
(explaining that “immigration law is not self-executing but requires due process and the exercise 
of discretion”). 
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migrants to assert—and for courts and agency decisionmakers to 
sustain—their rights indirectly and obliquely, even when 
unauthorized migrants cannot make claims on the same footing as 
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. 
To pursue this analysis, this Article examines four topics: 
(1) state and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants, (2) 
workplace rights and remedies, (3) the suppression of evidence from 
an unlawful search or seizure, and (4) the right to effective counsel in 
immigration court. Though these topics range broadly, the selection is 
not random. At least the first three have been arenas for sustained, 
often vehement debate, not just in the courts, legislatures, and 
agencies, but also in the media, communities, streets, and wherever 
public debate about immigration outside the law has surfaced. But 
beyond these topics’ practical significance, they share two features 
that make joint analysis worthwhile. First, the ability of unauthorized 
migrants to assert legal claims is deeply contested in these areas of 
law, unlike general acceptance of fire protection for unauthorized 
migrants, for example. Second, intense political and judicial activity 
has turned these areas into laboratories for emerging patterns of 
argument and decisionmaking.  
Part I discusses the recent efforts of numerous states and cities to 
address the arrival of unauthorized migrants by enacting laws 
intended to drive them out. Immigrants’ rights advocates have 
brought lawsuits challenging these state and local laws, which this 
Article sometimes refers to as subfederal laws.5 Part II examines legal 
issues that emerge from the essential role of unauthorized workers in 
many U.S. industries and occupations. The question has naturally 
arisen whether these workers are protected by the laws that address 
labor organizing, safety and health, discrimination, wages, and other 
aspects of the workplace. Part III analyzes the ability of unauthorized 
migrants to invoke Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful 
searches and seizures. These issues have arisen from the raids on 
worksites, homes, and other venues that have become a significant 
part of immigration law enforcement. Part IV looks at the right to 
effective counsel in immigration court. Though much less visible in 
 
 5. I use the term “subfederal” to include states, counties, cities, school districts, special 
districts, and all other government entities below the federal level. When this Article refers to 
“states and localities,” “states and cities,” and “state and local,” I intend these phrases to refer 
to the same government entities as the term “subfederal.” 
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public politics, this issue has been the focus of heated controversy 
between the federal government and advocacy groups. 
I do not claim that these four inquiries combine to be exhaustive. 
But, taken together, they illustrate key facets of the incomplete 
integration of unauthorized migrants into the U.S. legal system in 
ways that are more revealing than analysis of any one of these areas 
alone. Unauthorized migrants can assert their rights in practical 
effect—albeit indirectly and incompletely—by adopting at least five 
general patterns that cut across these four substantive areas. All five 
patterns allow unauthorized migrants to assert oblique versions of 
rights that U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents can exercise in 
the same settings. 
First, unauthorized migrants may successfully challenge a 
government decision because the wrong agency or official makes it, 
even if they cannot challenge the decision’s substance. For example, 
even when it is extremely difficult to attack a state or local law on 
equal protection grounds, the possibility of race or ethnic 
discrimination may help convince a court that a state or local law is 
preempted because state and local governments are institutionally 
more susceptible to improper bias. This is what I call an institutional 
competence argument. 
Second, an unauthorized migrant might successfully assert a right 
against a wrongdoer, but only as to conduct that is more culpable 
than the unauthorized migrant’s. For example, unauthorized workers 
who have been injured on the job may enhance the likely success of 
lost future wage claims against their employers by arguing that the 
employer’s culpability in allowing the employees to work outweighed 
the employee’s own culpability in working without authorization. I 
call this a comparative culpability argument. 
Third, an unauthorized migrant may successfully assert rights if 
recognizing those rights would protect a U.S. citizen or lawfully 
present noncitizen who serves as a citizen proxy. For example, courts 
adjudicating a noncitizen’s removal from the United States may 
suppress evidence from a search that violates the Fourth Amendment 
in a way—such as by improperly relying on ethnic appearance—that 
may harm U.S. citizens if the same practice were applied to them. 
This is what I term a citizen proxy argument. 
Fourth, even if a direct challenge to the substance of an 
immigration rule fails, a court might invalidate the process of 
reaching or applying that decision. For example, a court that balks at 
an explicit grant of workplace rights to an unauthorized worker might 
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reach the same result by adopting a traditional procedural rule that 
puts immigration law status beyond the scope of civil discovery. The 
result is to treat unauthorized migrants as if they were lawfully 
present. I refer to this as a procedural surrogate argument. 
Fifth, a government action may withstand constitutional 
challenge, but a court might find that it violates a statute or 
regulation. For example, an immigration judge may hesitate to find as 
a constitutional matter that evidence should be suppressed under the 
limited exclusionary rule that applies in removal proceedings for 
Fourth Amendment violations. The same judge may nonetheless 
order suppression because the search violated the federal 
government’s own regulations. This is a phantom norm argument. 
This Article discusses these and further examples of the five 
patterns. Together, these patterns—which emerge from and cut 
across the four topics discussed in this Article—show how 
unauthorized migrants remain at the law’s margins with rights that 
are indirect and oblique. 
I.  STATE AND LOCAL LAWS 
For the American republic’s first century, state and local 
immigration laws were almost the only source of immigration 
regulation.6 There were many reasons for this, some of which might 
not immediately appear relevant today. Of these reasons, perhaps the 
most arresting was slavery.7 While it existed, the federal government 
could not regulate migration without addressing intractable questions 
about the movement of slaves and free blacks. Only after the Civil 
War did today’s prevailing view of immigration federalism—that 
federal immigration regulation displaces any state laws on the 
admission and expulsion of noncitizens—begin to emerge.8 
 
 6. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835–84 (1993) (exploring pre-1875 state and local immigration laws); 
see also ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 
FASHIONING OF AMERICA 74–76 (2006) (discussing state regulatory efforts). 
 7. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 24–25 (2006) (discussing factors that 
influenced the shift to federal immigration laws). 
 8. See Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 270–75 (1876) (holding unconstitutional 
New York and Louisiana statutes that regulated the admission of immigrants through the port 
of New York, on the ground that they infringed upon the federal power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–81 (1876) (“The passage of laws 
which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to 
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Constrained by federal preemption of any state and local laws 
that directly regulate immigration, states and localities have 
addressed immigration outside the law in two other ways. One is state 
and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement—for 
example, agreements authorizing states and localities to carry out 
some federal enforcement functions.9 The other, which is the focus of 
this Part, consists of numerous state and local laws limiting access to 
education, employment, housing, health care, or welfare, or otherwise 
making life harder for the unauthorized10 to persuade or force them to 
leave.11 
These state and local laws merit analysis because they illustrate 
the key role that institutional competence arguments can play in 
allowing unauthorized migrants to assert rights obliquely and 
incompletely. This Part focuses principally on the connections 
between (a) individual rights arguments grounded in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (b) institutional 
competence arguments grounded in federal preemption. Section A 
explains how equal protection arguments against unfavorable 
treatment of unauthorized migrants are extremely difficult to make.12 
And yet, as Section B discusses, the same evidence that weakly 
supports an equal protection challenge may be crucial to the success 
of a preemption challenge. In this way, as Section C addresses, a 
preemption-based institutional competence argument allows 
unauthorized migrants to assert their individual rights obliquely, 
though sometimes with unintended consequences. 
 
Congress, and not to the States.”). See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 7, at 21–25 (discussing 
the shift from state to federal immigration regulation). 
 9. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) 
(authorizing agreements that allow state and local officers to investigate, apprehend, and detain 
aliens to enforce federal immigration laws). 
 10. See CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & KIMBERLY NORTMAN, TESTING 
THE LIMITS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL 
IMMIGRATION MEASURES 8–9, 23–24, 32–43, 47–51 (2007) (summarizing recent state and local 
measures). 
 11. See Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 160 (2008) (“If a strategy of attrition through 
enforcement were implemented nationwide, it would gradually, but inexorably, reduce the 
number of illegal aliens in the United States.”); Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal 
Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement, BACKGROUNDER (Center for 
Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), May 2005, at 1, 1–6, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/ 
2005/back605.pdf (arguing that consistent enforcement of immigration laws would steadily 
reduce the population of unauthorized migrants). 
 12. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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A. Individual Rights: Equal Protection 
A 1975 Texas statute allowing local school districts to deny 
enrollment to any child not “legally admitted” to the United States 
ushered in the modern era for state and local laws addressing 
unauthorized migration.13 The ensuing litigation led to the 1982 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe,14 which upheld, as a matter 
of constitutional law, the access of schoolchildren living in Texas to 
public elementary and secondary schools regardless of the child’s 
immigration law status.15 
Plyler is foundational for understanding immigration outside the 
law. The decision is especially valuable for understanding the 
connections between individual rights and institutional competence 
arguments because the plaintiff schoolchildren challenged the Texas 
statute on both equal protection and preemption grounds.16 Early in 
its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear its view that it did 
not need to address the preemption challenge.17 Turning almost 
immediately to the equal protection issue, the Court started with the 
proposition that the Constitution—in particular, the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment—applies to 
all persons in the United States, regardless of lawful or unlawful 
presence.18 The dissent agreed with this proposition.19 
But what matters is not whether but how the Constitution applies 
to unauthorized migrants. As a decision on constitutional claims by 
unauthorized migrants, Plyler’s holding has been confined to the 
context in which it arose.20 The Court’s equal protection rationale—
especially its application of intermediate judicial scrutiny21—relied so 
 
 13. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1981), invalidated by Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982). 
 14. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 15. Id. at 216–30. 
 16. See id. at 206–10 (discussing the lower courts’ decisions, including rulings on 
preemption). 
 17. See id. at 210 n.8 (“Appellees . . . continue to press the argument that § 21.031 is pre-
empted by federal law and policy. In light of our disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment 
issue, we have no occasion to reach this claim.”). 
 18. Id. at 210–16. 
 19. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal 
entry into this country, are indeed physically ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a state.”). 
 20. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 2043 (exploring why Plyler has not been extended 
beyond the context of public primary and secondary education). 
 21. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–30. 
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heavily on the involvement of children and education22 that no court 
has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized 
migrants outside the context of K–12 public education.23 
That Plyler only weakly supports equal protection challenges to 
statutes that disadvantage unauthorized migrants is consistent with 
the case law on equal protection challenges by noncitizens who are in 
the United States. These decisions have sometimes sustained equal 
protection challenges, but only by noncitizens who are lawfully 
present. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Graham v. 
Richardson,24 which held that Arizona and Pennsylvania ran afoul of 
both equal protection and preemption because their state welfare 
benefits rules barred lawful permanent residents, is a landmark.25 To 
be sure, Graham did not distinguish between lawfully and unlawfully 
present noncitizens. The Court observed generally that 
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or 
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”26 
Citing the famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,27 the next sentence in Graham declared, “Aliens as a class are a 
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”28 Here, too, the Court 
seemed to address all noncitizens together. 
But later cases have established that strict scrutiny does not 
apply to all statutes that treat unauthorized migrants and U.S. citizens 
differently. The 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. 
Diaz29 concerned lawfully present noncitizens but is relevant to 
unauthorized migrants because the Court defined constitutional limits 
on federal laws that affect noncitizens. Diaz upheld federal rules that 
denied Medicare eligibility to some lawfully present noncitizens, 
including some who had been permanent residents for less than five 
 
 22. See id. at 218–30 (discussing the importance of education, and the great societal and 
individual harms that occur when it is denied to children). 
 23. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 2075–76 (discussing Plyler’s narrow doctrinal scope). In 
this regard, Plyler stands in sharp contrast to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
which also arose in the context of K–12 public education but acquired a broader significance as 
the starting point for the invalidation of segregation in many other American institutions. 
 24. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 25. Id. at 371–80. 
 26. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted). 
 27. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 28. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (citation omitted). 
 29. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
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years.30 In contrast to Graham, the Court held in Diaz that strict 
scrutiny does not apply to a federal enactment that disadvantages 
lawful permanent residents.31 
Though Diaz said that the federal government may disadvantage 
permanent residents when states cannot, the Court did not simply 
apply preemption analysis.32 Instead, it explained that “equal 
protection analysis . . . involves significantly different considerations 
because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States 
rather than between aliens and the Federal Government.”33 Together, 
Graham and Diaz establish that equal protection doctrine limits both 
federal and subfederal governments, but the federal government has 
greater power than the states to classify by immigration and 
citizenship status.34 
Six years after Diaz, the Court reasoned in Plyler that strict 
scrutiny does not apply to a law that disadvantages unauthorized 
 
 30. Id. at 77–87. 
 31. See id. at 81–84 (asserting that the need for flexibility in policy choices in the face of 
changing world conditions requires “a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the 
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization”); see also id. at 80 
(“Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident 
diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in 
the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its 
guests.”). 
 32. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the 
National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 283–93 (exploring possible justifications for the 
Court’s restrained review of the statute at issue); cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a 
Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98–
102 (1985) (exploring the substantive norms inside Justice Blackmun’s equal protection 
framework as it applies to aliens); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism 
and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 205–06 (1994) (explaining that an equal protection 
model can justify certain alienage classifications on a federal level where those same 
classifications would be unacceptable on a state level); Neuman, supra note 2, at 1430–40 
(arguing for the validity and necessity of an equal protection approach to discrimination against 
aliens). But see David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal 
Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1085–86, 1088 (1979) (asserting that Diaz is better 
understood as a preemption decision than as an equal protection one); cf. Michael J. Perry, 
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–
65 (1979) (arguing that the Court’s doctrine concerning alienage-based classifications is 
justifiable not as a matter of equal protection, but rather of federalism). 
 33. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84–85. 
 34. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (“As a general matter, a state law that 
discriminates on the basis of alienage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial 
scrutiny.”). 
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migrants because they are not a “suspect class.”35 Beyond the context 
of access to K–12 public education, subfederal laws that disadvantage 
unauthorized migrants require only a rational basis.36 So far, history 
has shown Plyler to be a high-water mark, and not a decision that 
prompted a new era in equal protection for unauthorized migrants 
generally. 
In contrast to equal protection challenges that characterize laws 
disadvantaging unauthorized migrants as based on immigration 
status, is there any room to argue that these laws are based on race 
and/or ethnicity, and thus violate equal protection for that reason? 
The plaintiffs made this argument in Lozano v. City of Hazleton,37 
which challenged ordinances adopted in 2006 and 2007 by the city of 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania.38 One ordinance barred the employment and 
harboring of unauthorized migrants.39 Another required renters to 
have occupancy permits, which city officials would issue only upon 
proof of lawful residence or U.S. citizenship.40 The plaintiffs argued, 
among other things, that the city violated equal protection by 
discriminating unlawfully by race, ethnicity, and national origin.41 
They presented evidence that the ordinances would 
disproportionately affect Latinos, but District Judge James Munley, 
 
 35. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (“Unlike most of the classifications that 
we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the 
product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime.”). 
 36. Cf. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415–19 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that laws affecting 
nonimmigrant aliens require only a rational basis). Commentators have criticized this aspect of 
prevailing doctrine as providing insufficient protection to unauthorized migrants. See, e.g., Jason 
H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The Equal Protection Rights of 
Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 19–40 (2008) (arguing that a lesser standard 
of review for classifications involving illegal immigrants is inconsistent with the principles of 
individual dignity and humanity that underlie the Equal Protection Clause); Neuman, supra 
note 2, at 1440–52 (arguing that rational basis review would allow the state to deny 
unauthorized migrants even the minimum standards that it owes under the Constitution to 
every human being). In Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court expressly 
declined to reach the nonimmigrants’ equal protection claims. Id. at 9–10. 
 37. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, No. 07-3531 
(3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008). 
 38. Id. at 484–85. 
 39. Id. at 484. 
 40. Id. By discussing a local law directed at unauthorized migrants, I do not mean to ignore 
the many subfederal laws and policies that attempt to integrate unauthorized migrants, or even 
to offer protection from enforcement of federal immigration laws. See generally Motomura, 
supra note 2, at 2075–83 (discussing the role of states and localities in the integration of 
unauthorized migrants). 
 41. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 538–42. 
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noting the ordinances’ facial neutrality, found insufficient evidence of 
discriminatory intent, which an equal protection challenge requires.42 
As long as the touchstone in prevailing constitutional doctrine is 
intent rather than effect, race or ethnic discrimination is an 
unpromising way to argue that subfederal laws violate equal 
protection by targeting unauthorized migrants. And as long as courts 
demand only a rational basis for statutes that disadvantage 
noncitizens because they are in the United States unlawfully, equal 
protection challenges based on immigration status alone will fail. 
A telling sign that attorneys for unauthorized migrants recognize 
these severe limitations is the plaintiffs’ strategy in Equal Access 
Education v. Merten.43 That litigation responded to a 2002 opinion by 
the Virginia Attorney General that “illegal or undocumented aliens 
should not be enrolled in Virginia public institutions of higher 
education.”44 The plaintiffs did not argue that such a state bar to 
admission violated equal protection. Rather, their constitutional 
challenge relied principally on federal preemption.45 
In Equal Access Education, the plaintiffs gave up on the equal 
protection argument that carried the day in Plyler, instead relying 
only on the preemption argument Plyler had expressly declined to 
 
 42. Id. at 540–42 (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). The 
same dilemma exists as to other state and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants. It is not 
enough to win an unlawful race or ethnic discrimination claim. This is true even if challengers 
can show some racial or ethnic animus. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration 
Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and 
Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 651 (1995) (“[I]t is difficult to refute the claim 
that the ethnicity of the stereotypical undocumented immigrant played at least some role in the 
passage of Proposition 187.” (footnote omitted)); Neuman, supra note 2, at 1451–52 (discussing 
“strong indications that Proposition 187 owed some of its attractiveness to animosity toward 
Latino immigration”). Interestingly, though Judge Munley rejected the plaintiffs’ equal 
protection claim in City of Hazleton, he sustained their argument that the ordinance, by 
restricting access to rental housing, violated the rights of unauthorized migrants under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, which “provides that ‘all persons’ shall . . . have the same right to make and enforce 
contracts and have the full and equal benefit of all laws to the same extent enjoyed by ‘white 
citizens.’” City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 546–48. 
 43. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 44. Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Attorney Gen. of Va., to Presidents, 
Chancellor, Rectors, Registrars, Admissions Dirs., Domicile Officers, and Foreign Student 
Advisors, and the Executive Dir., State Council for Higher Educ. in Va. (Sept. 5, 2002), 
available at http://www.schev.edu/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-5-02APL.pdf. For a 
discussion of this Memorandum, see Equal Access Educ., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
 45. Equal Access Educ., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 601–08. 
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address.46 This emphasis on preemption has been a sound strategy, 
according to the track record for preemption challenges to subfederal 
laws targeting unauthorized migrants. With the prominent exception 
of Plyler, the courts that have invalidated state and local laws have 
generally relied on preemption.47 In doing so, they have applied the 
framework from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in 
De Canas v. Bica48 to decide if a state or local immigration-related law 
conflicts with federal law.49 Given the obstacles to equal protection 
claims by unauthorized migrants, preemption has become the 
challenge of choice, and thus the focus of judicial opinions. 
B. Institutional Competence Arguments: Preemption 
What is the significance of the trend away from equal protection 
challenges to subfederal laws toward preemption arguments? The 
challengers’ reliance on preemption taps into a long tradition of 
institutional competence claims in immigration and alienage law. 
Government action, even if not susceptible to equal protection or any 
other individual rights challenge, may be invalid if the government 
actor is not institutionally competent to make the decision. Thus, 
preemption can nullify a state or local law, even assuming that a 
substantively identical federal law would be valid. 
To understand the relationship between preemption as an 
institutional competence argument and equal protection as its 
individual rights counterpart, it is important first to see that 
preemption is not the only type of institutional competence argument 
with purchase in immigration and alienage law. Consider the 1976 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,50 which 
 
 46. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 n.8 (1982); see also supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
 47. E.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764–72 
(N.D. Tex. 2007); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1054–57 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
 48. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). A state or local law relating to immigration or 
immigrants is preempted if it meets any of the three tests set out in De Canas. First, federal law 
preempts any state attempt to regulate immigration. Id. at 354. Second, state law is preempted if 
Congress intended to “occupy the field” in that it was the “clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress” to effect a “complete ouster of state power—including state power to promulgate 
laws not in conflict with federal laws.” Id. at 357 & n.5 (citation omitted). Third, a state law is 
preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress,” id. at 363 (citations omitted), or conflicts with federal law so as to 
make compliance with both state and federal law impossible. 
 49. See id. at 354–63 (establishing a preemption framework). 
 50. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
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concerned a Civil Service Commission requirement that federal 
employees be U.S. citizens or nationals.51 The Court invalidated the 
rule because the wrong federal agency had adopted it.52 The Court 
reasoned that the Civil Service Commission could not act pursuant to 
the federal immigration and naturalization power, and thus lacked 
institutional competence to make decisions on immigration or 
immigrants.53 But the Court suggested that either Congress or the 
president could adopt the same requirement, and lower courts later 
upheld an Executive Order from President Gerald Ford that 
generally barred noncitizens from federal jobs.54 
Similar reasoning is evident in Aliessa v. Novello,55 a prominent 
New York Court of Appeals decision that invalidated a New York 
state restriction on state Medicaid benefits for lawfully present 
noncitizens.56 The plaintiffs argued that Graham v. Richardson 
controlled, with its apparent prohibition on state laws disadvantaging 
lawfully present noncitizens.57 The state responded that Mathews v. 
Diaz had recognized federal authority to adopt different eligibility 
rules for citizens and lawfully present noncitizens,58 and that Congress 
had expressly delegated that authority to the states. In Aliessa, the 
New York Court of Appeals rejected the state’s argument.59 Citing 
Mow Sun Wong, the court held that the federal government cannot 
authorize the states to adopt their own rules.60 The outcomes, the 
court explained, would vary from state to state, violating the 
 
 51. Id. at 90 n.6 (discussing the requirement in the Civil Service Commission regulations, 
5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976), that only U.S. citizens or people owing “permanent allegiance” to the 
United States may sit for competitive civil service examinations). 
 52. Id. at 114–17 (“Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by 
Congress and the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting 
under the Attorney General of the United States, due process requires that the decision . . . be 
made at either a comparable level of government or . . . be justified by reasons which are 
properly the concern of [the Civil Service Commission].”). 
 53. Id. at 101–03, 105, 114–16. 
 54. See Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 744–45 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub 
nom. Lum v. Campbell, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (affirming both the president’s power to issue and 
the constitutionality of 5 C.F.R. §§ 7.4 and 338.101). 
 55. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
 56. Id. at 1098. 
 57. Id. at 1095 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)). 
 58. Id. at 1096 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). 
 59. Id. at 1094–99. 
 60. Id. at 1097–98. 
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constitutional requirement of uniform citizenship rules.61 This, again, 
was an institutional competence argument. 
Of course, institutional competence arguments are not unique to 
the law governing unauthorized migration, or to immigration and 
alienage law. But they make a difference in the outcome of cases 
when individual rights claims by noncitizens are difficult to sustain. In 
Mow Sun Wong, the obstacle was not unlawful immigration status 
because the plaintiffs were lawful permanent residents of the United 
States.62 But even for lawful permanent residents, an alienage-based 
equal protection challenge to a properly adopted federal requirement 
of citizenship was impossible to win, according to Diaz.63 Graham did 
not help plaintiffs because it addressed only state laws.64 With bleak 
prospects for any individual rights claim, the institutional competence 
argument was the Mow Sun Wong plaintiffs’ only winning 
constitutional challenge. 
An analogous situation prevails in the context of state and local 
laws that target unauthorized migrants. Just as the federal 
government can treat lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens 
differently, state and local governments can disadvantage 
unauthorized migrants as long as the case involves neither access to 
public K–12 education nor proof of racial or ethnic discrimination.65 
Because it is extremely difficult to succeed with equal protection 
claims based on immigration law status, race, or ethnicity,66 
institutional competence claims have special significance for 
unauthorized migrants. A preemption-based institutional competence 
argument, not an equal protection–based individual rights argument, 
is typically the challengers’ only hope of prevailing and the statute’s 
only risk of invalidation. 
 
 61. Id. But see Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255–57 (10th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing 
with Aliessa and upholding a similar Colorado statute). 
 62. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 90 (1976). 
 63. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84. 
 64. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971). 
 65. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (addressing the K–12 education 
context), with Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 540–41 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, 
No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenges to city 
ordinances restricting the access of undocumented aliens to employment and rental housing, 
because the plaintiffs failed to show that the ordinances were motivated by discriminatory 
intent). 
 66. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Implications of Institutional Competence Arguments 
What are the implications of pursuing institutional competence 
claims like preemption instead of individual rights claims like equal 
protection? Professor Harold Koh once observed that preemption is 
much weaker than equal protection as a vehicle for redressing harms 
that befall noncitizens.67 Analyzing why permanent residents could 
challenge state laws in Graham but not the federal law in Diaz, he 
argued that preemption did not explain the different outcomes. 
Professor Koh wrote: “A pure preemption theory, based solely on a 
structural norm, lacks substantive content. For that reason, it cannot 
serve as a theory of individual ‘rights’ at all.”68 
Professor Koh’s reasoning seems persuasive as applied to lawful 
permanent residents, to whom Graham gives robust equal 
protection–based constitutional status.69 For unauthorized migrants, 
however, equal protection offers very little.70 What matters for them is 
how institutional competence arguments may sometimes substitute 
for the inability to assert individual rights directly. And when one 
examines courts’ decisions on preemption challenges to subfederal 
laws that target unauthorized migrants, three patterns emerge that 
jointly show how preemption-based institutional competence 
arguments obliquely substitute for individual rights arguments based 
on equal protection. A judge concerned that racial or ethnic animus is 
the impetus for a law that targets unauthorized migrants can channel 
those concerns into the preemption analysis. This channeling allows 
preemption to operate obliquely as equal protection for unauthorized 
migrants. 
First, and unsurprisingly, courts have insisted that state and local 
laws rely on federal immigration law status rather than draw their 
own lines. According to the district court in Equal Access Education, 
any Virginia rule barring unauthorized migrants from state colleges 
and universities would be preempted if it applies “standards different 
 
 67. See Koh, supra note 32, at 99–100 (“I prefer an equal protection approach because it 
answers, in a way that preemption reasoning does not, the moral and philosophical claims that 
resident aliens make against their state governments.”). 
 68. Id. at 98; see also Neuman, supra note 2, at 1436–40. 
 69. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
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from those established under federal law to determine an applicant’s 
immigration status.”71 
Even when state and local laws rely on federal immigration law 
standards, some federal courts remain skeptical. The apparent 
concern is that these state and local laws will affect some 
unauthorized migrants whom federal immigration enforcement might 
not target. One court expressed concern that state and local laws 
would undermine federal enforcement,72 while another court 
expressed the opposite concern—that state and local laws would 
overenforce federal immigration law.73 These decisions elucidate how 
preemption can give oblique expression to equal protection 
arguments. 
In the second pattern, the concern that a local ordinance would 
undermine federal enforcement was the basis for District Court Judge 
John Houston’s reasoning in Garrett v. City of Escondido,74 which 
involved a challenge to a local ordinance in Escondido, California.75 
The ordinance penalized housing owners for “harbor[ing] an illegal 
alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact 
that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in 
violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly 
permitted by federal law.”76 City officials had to check an occupant’s 
immigration status with the federal government.77 
Responding to a preemption challenge, Judge Houston blocked 
enforcement with a temporary restraining order, reasoning that the 
 
 71. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 608 (E.D. Va. 2004). The district 
court allowed the claim to proceed subject to factfinding on whether Virginia relied on federal 
standards, but it never decided that issue because it dismissed the plaintiffs’ preemption claim 
for lack of standing. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 663–72 (E.D. Va. 2004); 
see also Nathan G. Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal Standards 
in State and Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47, 53 (2008). For a similar insistence 
that subfederal laws rely on federal immigration status, see Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of 
Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861–62, 866–67, 869–71 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (granting a 
permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance); Villas at Parkside Partners v. 
City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762, 766–69 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance mandating certification of 
citizenship or immigration status to rent apartment property). 
 72. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
 73. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 527–28 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, No. 
07-3531 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008). 
 74. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
 75. Id. at 1047–48. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1048. 
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ordinance “could stand as a burden or obstacle to federal law.”78 
Unlike Judge T.S. Ellis in Equal Access Education—who would have 
struck down the Virginia policy had it not relied on federal 
immigration law categories79—Judge Houston was concerned that 
Escondido would use a federal database to check unlawful presence.80 
Considering how enforcement operates in practice, he explained, 
“That the Ordinance uses the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
define ‘illegal alien’ implies that it will likely place burdens on the 
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that will impede the 
functions of those federal agencies.”81 
In a third pattern, overenforcing federal immigration law was 
Judge Munley’s concern in Lozano v. City of Hazleton. Though he 
rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument,82 Judge Munley 
sustained the preemption challenge—even though the ordinances 
relied on federal immigration status—because federal law struck a 
different “balance between finding and removing undocumented 
immigrants without accidentally removing immigrants and legal 
citizens, all without imposing too much of a burden on employers and 
workers.”83 It is wrong to assume, he explained, that “the federal 
government seeks the removal of all aliens who lack legal status.”84 
 
 78. Id. at 1057 (“The Court . . . has serious concerns regarding the burden this Ordinance 
will place on federal regulations and resources.”). 
 79. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602–08 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting 
that the outcome of the case turned on “whether defendants’ admissions policies simply 
adopted federal standards, in which case they are not invalid under the Supremacy Clause, or 
instead create and apply state standards to assess the immigration status of applicants, in which 
case the policies may run afoul of the Supremacy Clause”). 
 80. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. Several weeks later, the city consented to a 
permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance, and to paying $90,000 in plaintiffs’ 
attorney fees. Garrett v. City of Escondido, No. 06CV2434JAH (NLS) (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) 
(order granting stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction). The state of California 
responded with a statute that barred cities and counties from requiring landlords to inquire into 
a prospective occupant’s immigration or citizenship status. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.3 (West 
Supp. 2009). See generally California Legislative News, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2495 
(2007). 
 81. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42. 
 83. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 527–33. Compare Cortez, supra note 71, at 64 
(expressing approval of this aspect of City of Hazleton), with Cristina M. Rodríguez, The 
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 620–28 (2008) 
(criticizing this aspect of City of Hazleton). 
 84. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
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Rather, “it is completely within the discretion of the federal officials 
to remove persons from the country who are removable.”85 
I should acknowledge that unlike City of Escondido and City of 
Hazleton, other cases have rejected preemption challenges to state 
and local laws.86 But my purpose in discussing these decisions is not to 
restate the prevailing doctrine on preemption. My purpose 
throughout this Article is to analyze and connect emerging patterns of 
argument and decisionmaking that may or may not become routine or 
prevalent. In the context of state and local laws, I want to explain why 
it matters that a court sustains a preemption challenge when an 
individual rights challenge based on equal protection fails or is never 
brought. These reasoning patterns show how preemption may 
substitute partially for equal protection by striking down state and 
local laws when equal protection challenges might not succeed in 
doing so. 
The explanation begins by noting that the meaning of unlawful 
presence is heavily contested. Some observers view determinations of 
federal immigration status as largely ministerial, and they urge state 
and local officials to act on these straightforward findings of illegality 
by impeding access to work and housing, and even by arresting 
unauthorized migrants.87 But according to the view of unlawful 
presence in City of Escondido and City of Hazleton, a noncitizen’s 
actual removal from the United States and other facets of 
immigration law enforcement reflect complex, highly discretionary 
choices. It matters who allocates resources and picks enforcement 
 
 85. Id. at 530–31. Relatedly, the court noted that only federal immigration judges can 
determine immigration law status. Id. at 533. 
 86. Some of these decisions rely on a provision of federal immigration law that may 
expressly authorize some state employer sanctions laws. See INA § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(h)(2) (2006). Courts are divided on whether this savings clause allows state laws that 
penalize employers through business licensing schemes. Compare City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 
2d at 519–20 (finding preemption notwithstanding this provision), with Chicanos Por La Causa, 
Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864–66 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed sub nom. U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 78 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. July 24, 2009) (No. 90-115) 
(finding that this provision authorizes state licensing-based employer sanctions), and Gray v. 
City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV0081ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *9–12 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) 
(same). State laws might be invalidated if the savings clause is construed to give preemptive 
effect to IRCA. Cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 765–71 (10th Cir. 
2010) (granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of various Oklahoma state 
laws based on a likelihood of success in challenging some provisions on preemption grounds). 
 87. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 11. For a discussion of the range of views of the meaning 
of unlawful presence and how this range explains some of the deep disagreements about 
immigration outside the law, see Motomura, supra note 2, at 2044, 2047–55. 
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targets and who balances enforcement goals against competing 
concerns.88 
What are these competing concerns? If some judges are troubled 
when state or local initiatives vary from federal enforcement, what 
exactly troubles them? One concern, cited in City of Hazleton, is that 
cumbersome enforcement of employer sanctions may hamper 
business efficiency.89 Although this is true enough, the most forceful 
and often repeated criticism of state and local involvement in 
immigration enforcement is improper reliance on race and ethnicity. 
This criticism does not necessarily object to the enforcement of 
immigration laws or argue that immigration laws have not been 
broken. Rather, the concern is that not only unauthorized migrants, 
but also lawfully present U.S. citizens and noncitizens, will suffer 
targeting and discrimination by race and ethnicity.90 
In this setting, preemption-based skepticism of state and local 
enforcement can give expression to concerns about discrimination. 
An equal protection challenge would require proof of discriminatory 
intent, but a preemption challenge can persuade some judges based 
on reasonable possibility of discriminatory intent. One wonders if the 
court in City of Hazleton would have found preemption if the 
plaintiffs had not introduced so much evidence on race and ethnicity. 
Though that evidence was insufficient to sustain an equal protection 
claim, it is hard to read Judge Munley’s discussion of local variance 
from federal enforcement in his preemption analysis without also 
considering his discussions of demographic shifts in Hazleton, his 
analysis of the atmosphere of intimidation of local Latino residents, 
and his appendix on U.S. immigration history, which emphasized the 
historical role of racial exclusion.91 
 
 88. For a discussion of the meaning of unlawful presence, the role of states and cities, and 
how these issues are linked, see Motomura, supra note 2, at 2047–65. 
 89. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 525–29. 
 90. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 
U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 318–20 (2009) (describing racial profiling in immigration raids); Huyen 
Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement 
of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 982–83 (2004); 
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004); Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration 
Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 113, 119 (2007). 
 91. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (mentioning demographic shifts); id. at 508–10 
(discussing reasons to allow some plaintiffs to proceed anonymously); id. at 556–63 (outlining 
the history of U.S immigration law and policy). 
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Put differently, preemption and equal protection can function 
roughly as alternative vehicles for expressing concern about racial 
and ethnic discrimination. Plaintiffs will likely lose an equal 
protection argument because of the law’s requirement of 
discriminatory intent and its presumption against finding it. A 
preemption argument can manage doubt differently by shifting the 
risk of uncertain knowledge from the plaintiff to state and local 
governments. Courts may sustain preemption challenges out of 
concern that state and local laws addressing unauthorized migration 
give state and local actors a zone of discretion that is too broad 
because it enables improper reliance on race and ethnicity.92 
Because not all judges will view preemption like the court in City 
of Hazleton, the future success of any such preemption-based 
institutional competence argument is uncertain. But, as an approach 
to argument and analysis, preemption offers a middle ground in 
constitutional challenges to subfederal laws. It leaves intact the likely 
rejection of equal protection claims, which under prevailing doctrine 
would require either extending the antidiscrimination norm in 
Graham from lawful permanent residents to unauthorized migrants, 
or relaxing the requirements for proving unlawful discrimination on 
the basis of race or ethnicity. At the same time, preemption avoids 
relegating unauthorized migrants to a zone without constitutional 
protections. This might be the result if courts reject not only equal 
protection challenges based on discrimination by race, ethnicity, and 
unlawful immigration status, but also preemption challenges. 
What explains this middle ground? This is really two questions. 
One asks how preemption, as an institutional competence argument, 
serves as a compromise. Part of the answer is that preemption of state 
and local laws affecting immigrants reflects a reliance on the political 
process, especially on transparency and deliberation in a larger 
federal policy arena with a more complex array of counterweights 
than would shape state or local decisionmaking.93 With regard to 
unauthorized migrants, if laws and policies must be enacted 
nationally, then many that raise constitutional concerns—such as 
 
 92. This pattern bears some resemblance to the concerns expressed by the New York 
Court of Appeals in Aliessa v. Novello. See supra text accompanying notes 55–61. 
 93. For an illuminating discussion of the analogous value of transparency and deliberation 
in national security cases, see Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the 
Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661 (2009). Muscular procedure, by emphasizing 
“transparency and deliberation,” is closer to institutional competence arguments than to the 
procedural surrogates discussed in Part II. 
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racial or ethnic discrimination—might never be adopted.94 Practically, 
this is a form of constitutional avoidance. Preemption doctrine avoids 
serious constitutional questions about the efficacy of arguments based 
on an individual right like equal protection by enabling an 
institutional competence argument, which in turn forces government 
decisionmaking into a federal forum that makes a constitutionally 
doubtful statute less likely. 
At the same time, preemption arguments that allow the oblique 
assertion of equal protection rights can have other, unintended 
consequences because preemption is a double-edged sword. For 
example, limits on state and local laws targeting unauthorized 
migrants may also restrict the ability of state and local authorities to 
adopt policies that support or protect unauthorized migrants. In this 
way, these oblique rights generate dilemmas for advocates on all 
sides. Those who oppose in-state tuition for unauthorized students 
may argue that state authority is preempted,95 yet argue against the 
preemption of state and local laws that seek to reduce unauthorized 
population by attrition.96 
The second question is more fundamental: why does preemption 
as a middle ground have such appeal? The answer goes back to the 
idea of discretion in immigration law enforcement, and why this 
discretion is unusually broad. Here, as is often true when the topic is 
immigration outside the law, it is useful to return to Plyler. In that 
case, Justice Brennan acknowledged that because of a tolerance of a 
“‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants,” even noncitizens who lack 
any avenues of relief and whose presence in the United States is 
clearly unlawful are unlikely to be apprehended, let alone adjudicated 
 
 94. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 1436–37 (explaining why “[l]ocal anti-foreign movements 
may have difficulty enlisting the national government in their crusades”). But cf. Peter J. Spiro, 
Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1635 (1997) (“[A] state 
disempowered from acting in its own jurisdiction will get its way at the national level in the 
absence of strong countervailing interests on the part of other states . . . .”). For a discussion of 
this phenomenon in the context of subfederal restrictions on speech, see Adam Winkler, Free 
Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 160–63 (2009) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Professor Winkler’s study does not include First 
Amendment challenges to local laws that restrict the activities of day laborers, but it would be 
illuminating to see if judicial responses to such challenges revealed patterns similar to what I 
discuss here. 
 95. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 524–25 (Ct. 
App. 2008), review granted, 198 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2008). 
 96. See, e.g., City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
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as violators and deported.97 Similarly, Justice Powell commented in 
his concurrence on the long history of labor migration to the United 
States, particularly from Mexico.98 
A generation after Plyler, Justice Brennan’s observations remain 
accurate. Even if enforcement has often been visible and severe, 
chronic and intentional underenforcement of immigration law has 
been the de facto U.S. federal policy for over a century.99 Today, even 
more than a generation ago, enforcement resources are a mere 
fraction of what would be needed for a significant reduction in 
immigration outside the law. The reasons for this defy easy summary, 
but they include the needs and political clout of U.S. employers, as 
well as broad reluctance to erect border barriers that may not be cost-
effective and adopt databases and detection methods that may be 
error-prone and intrusive.100 Moreover, tolerating a substantial 
unauthorized population and then periodically conferring lawful 
status through discretionary relief or legalization may better meet the 
U.S. economy’s needs than trying to identify worthy immigrants in 
advance.101 
Against this national policy backdrop, an unsurprising middle 
ground recognizes the individual rights of unauthorized migrants, 
albeit indirectly and incompletely, through institutional competence 
arguments, especially preemption. Similar patterns of oblique rights 
appear in other substantive areas in which unauthorized migrants 
seek legal remedies. Parts II, III, and IV show that these oblique 
rights have emerged in several patterns that go beyond—yet are 
closely related to— institutional competence arguments. 
II.  WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS 
Typical workplace laws give employees some protection with 
regard to wages and hours, labor organizing, health and safety, and 
 
 97. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982). 
 98. Id. at 237–38 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 99. For more information on this de facto policy and its history, see MOTOMURA, supra 
note 7, at 129–35; Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 
641–72 (1981); Motomura, supra note 2, at 2047–55. 
 100. See David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 544–45 (2007) (noting that interest groups have slowed legislative 
efforts to reduce unauthorized migration). 
 101. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 844–49 (2007) (arguing that the current enforcement system screens ex 
post and explaining why this may be preferable to screening ex ante). 
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employment discrimination, among other concerns. At the same time, 
immigration law forbids not only unlawful presence but also the 
employment of unauthorized workers. The latter is the target of the 
employer sanctions in the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) of 1986.102 What happens when an employee seeks work law 
protection, but is barred by immigration law from working?103 
The modern answer starts with a case that began in May 1988, 
when someone going by the name of Jose Castro applied for a job at 
the Hoffman Plastic Compounds factory in Panorama, California.104 
He had a birth certificate showing that he was born in El Paso, plus a 
Social Security card and a California state identification card.105 
Around Christmas 1988, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and 
Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, started to organize the plant 
with the help of some workers, including Castro.106 In January 1989, 
management heard about the drive and laid off nine employees, 
including Jose Castro.107 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that 
Hoffman Plastic had violated federal labor law by laying off 
employees because of their union activity.108 The proceedings also 
revealed that Castro was using a borrowed birth certificate, and that 
he was not in the United States legally, nor authorized to work.109 
Could the Board still award him the normal remedy—backpay for 
what he would have worked had he not been discharged illegally? 
The Board did so,110 but in 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed by a 
5–4 vote in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,111 holding 
that an employee who violates federal immigration law by working 
 
 102. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a 
(2006) (prohibiting the employment of unauthorized aliens). 
 103. See Bosniak, supra note 3, at 1041 (“With the passage of IRCA, the border law has 
become a labor law as well.”). 
 104. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
 105. For a fuller account of the case, see Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story 
of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for 
Undocumented Immigrants, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 311, 351 (David A. Martin & Peter H. 
Schuck eds., 2005). 
 106. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 140–41. 
 109. Id. at 141. 
 110. Id. at 141–42. 
 111. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
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cannot receive backpay from an employer who unlawfully discharges 
him.112 
Several court decisions since Hoffman have tried to define the 
limits that the Supreme Court put on remedies for unauthorized 
workers when employers violate work law. Some post-Hoffman cases 
involve federal law, including other aspects of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA),113 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,114 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).115 Other cases have arisen 
under various state laws relating to work, such as state worker 
compensation laws and state-law analogues to federal laws. 
This Part’s inquiry into workplace rights broadens Part I’s 
analysis of individual rights and institutional competence arguments 
in challenges to state and local laws addressing unauthorized 
migration. First, these workplace rights are not constitutional rights. 
Though they have some constitutional aspects, these rights originate 
in statutes that govern the workplace or in the common law of 
contracts and torts. 
Second, unauthorized migrants can assert workplace rights by 
making several types of arguments in addition to the institutional 
competence arguments discussed in Part I. Unauthorized migrants 
can sometimes assert their workplace rights by showing that their 
employer has engaged in comparatively more serious wrongdoing, an 
approach that I call comparative culpability. Another argument is 
that U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents may suffer if 
unauthorized workers are denied remedies. I call this a citizen proxy 
argument. A third argument challenges the procedures for reaching 
or applying a decision rather than the substance of the decision itself. 
This is a procedural surrogate argument. This Part concludes by 
explaining how any of these four arguments can be effective when 
they raise pragmatic concerns grounded in the integration of 
unauthorized workers into the U.S. economy. The combined result is 
that unauthorized migrants are able to assert their rights obliquely in 
 
 112. Id. at 151–52. The employer, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, had discharged Castro 
without knowing that he was not authorized to work. 
 113. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 150–69 (2006). 
 114. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006). For 
examples, see Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004); Escobar v. Spartan 
Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
 115. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006). For examples, see Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 323 (D.N.J. 2005); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
MOTOMORA IN FINAL 3/30/2010  6:17:43 AM 
2010] THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 1749 
ways that mirror societal ambivalence about their presence—here, in 
the context of the workplace. 
A. Comparative Culpability 
Judges may weigh a worker’s violation of immigration law either 
against a violation by that individual worker’s employer, or against 
violations by employers of unauthorized workers generally. As a 
result, courts may obliquely recognize the rights of an unauthorized 
worker even when such recognition might seem foreclosed. The 
Hoffman majority suggested the relevance of such a comparison 
when it reasoned that Jose Castro’s wrongdoing was not just working 
without authorization; he admittedly used false documents to obtain 
employment. The majority concluded that this violation of 
immigration made Castro ineligible for backpay.116 Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion in Hoffman also addressed Jose Castro’s 
wrongdoing but tempered its consequences in two ways. One is the 
focus on comparative culpability discussed here. The second is the 
citizen proxy argument discussed in the next Section. 
With regard to comparative culpability, Justice Breyer 
emphasized in Hoffman that Castro’s employer fired him—“a crude 
and obvious violation of the labor laws.”117 To deny backpay would 
give employers incentives to hire unauthorized workers, thereby 
undercutting immigration law enforcement.118 This focus on an 
employer’s comparative culpability is more explicit in a trilogy of 
cases from the state of New York addressing unauthorized workers’ 
ability to recover lost future wages as a remedy for workplace 
injuries. In all three cases, the injuries were attributable to an 
employer’s violation of occupational safety requirements under New 
York state statutes. All three injured employees were federal 
immigration law violators. All three sued for future lost wages 
because the injuries left them unable to return to work. And all three 
employers argued that the injured workers could not claim lost wages 
because they were not authorized to work. 
 
 116. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148–50; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the 
Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1393–95 (2009) (discussing employer 
and employee wrongdoing in Hoffman and characterizing Hoffman as a “guilty-
worker/innocent-employer scenario”). 
 117. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 155–56. 
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In the first case, Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC,119 the New York 
Court of Appeals found that Hoffman does not bar unauthorized 
workers from claiming lost wages.120 Distinguishing Hoffman as a case 
involving a worker who “criminally provided his employer with 
fraudulent papers,” the Court of Appeals reasoned that the 
employers in Balbuena were blameworthy.121 The court noted the lack 
of evidence that “plaintiffs produced false work documents in 
violation of IRCA or were even asked by the employers to present 
the work authorization documents as required by IRCA.”122 
Similar reliance on comparative culpability led the Second 
Circuit to reach the same result in Madeira v. Affordable Housing 
Foundation, Inc.123 “Nothing in the trial record indicates that Madeira 
himself used any false identification to obtain work in the United 
States; such action was apparently unnecessary given his brother’s 
willingness to hire him despite knowing Madeira’s undocumented 
status.”124 Focusing on the specific document-related prohibitions in 
IRCA—as opposed to a more general sense of culpability that might 
be associated with unauthorized work itself—the Second Circuit 
summed up: “it was the employer and not the worker who violated 
IRCA by arranging for employment.”125 
The same emphasis on comparative culpability led to the 
opposite outcome in Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Avenue LLC.126 District 
Judge Barbara Jones denied lost future wages to a worker who 
affirmatively presented false documents,127 distinguishing Balbuena 
and Madeira as cases in which the employers failed to ask for 
identification and work authorization documents.128 Noting this 
difference, Judge Jones explained: “Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages 
must be dismissed because Plaintiff is an undocumented alien who 
 
 119. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E. 2d 1246 (N.Y. 2006). 
 120. Id. at 1258–61. 
 121. Id. at 1258. 
 122. Id. (“[I]n the context of defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment, we must 
presume that it was the employers who violated IRCA by failing to inquire into plaintiffs’ 
immigration status or employment eligibility.”). 
 123. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found. Inc., 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 124. Id. at 223–24. 
 125. Id. at 228. 
 126. Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Ave. LLC, No. 06-CV-8163(BSJ), 2008 WL 4386751 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2008). 
 127. Id. at *13. 
 128. Id. at *12–13. 
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knowingly used fraudulent documentation to obtain employment . . . 
in violation of IRCA.”129 
So far I have discussed cases in which comparative culpability is a 
matter of immigration law violations. In cases like Balbuena, Madeira, 
and Ambrosi, any express or implied comparison involves the degree 
to which an employer or employee violated IRCA’s scheme to 
regulate unauthorized work. A more complete picture of comparative 
culpability arguments by unauthorized workers requires analysis of 
cases in which employee or employer wrongdoing reaches beyond 
IRCA’s employer sanctions. Consider, for example, an unauthorized 
worker’s claim that an employer has failed to pay wages as required 
by the Fair Labor Standards Act for work performed. The prevailing 
view is that working without authorization does not bar recovery of 
such wages.130 Though these courts generally do not engage in the 
explicit comparison apparent in Balbuena, Madeira, and Ambrosi, the 
reasons articulated for including unauthorized employees within the 
FLSA’s coverage rely on treating nonpayment of wages for past work 
performed as more culpable than unauthorized work.131 
B. Citizen Proxies 
In addition to comparative culpability, Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Hoffman suggested a second way of tempering the consequences of 
Jose Castro’s wrongdoing: making citizen proxy arguments for 
unauthorized workers’ rights. As with institutional competence 
arguments and comparative culpability arguments, these citizen proxy 
arguments allow unauthorized migrants to assert their rights 
 
 129. Id. at *13. This reliance on comparative culpability in workplace cases is consistent with 
a basic theme in the treatment of unauthorized migrants in immigration law generally, which 
opens up access to lawful immigration status when they have become victims, for example, of 
domestic violence, trafficking, or other crimes. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 2086 (discussing 
how immigration law treats victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other criminal activity as 
distinct from unauthorized migrants). 
 130. Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1276–77 (N.D. Okla. 2006) 
(recognizing unauthorized workers as employees under the FLSA); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 322–25 (D.N.J. 2005) (same); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 
230 F.R.D. 499, 501–03 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (same); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463–
64 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058–59 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(same). See generally Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 116, at 1370 & n.55 (discussing and 
citing cases arising under the FLSA). 
 131. See, e.g., Chellen, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1279–81 (discussing the nature of employer-
defendants’ violations of the FLSA); Flores, 233 F. Supp. 2d. at 464 (noting the need to include 
undocumented aliens within the protections of the FLSA to prevent “abusive exploitation” of 
workers). 
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obliquely—even when they may not be able to do so directly. When 
Breyer analyzed the employer’s wrongdoing, he addressed not only 
its comparative culpability but also what the systemic consequences in 
the U.S. labor market would be if unauthorized workers were denied 
remedies.132 
Though the Hoffman dissent considered the systemic effects on 
labor union organizing, it did not describe or identify the types of 
workers who would be protected by allowing the full range of NLRA 
remedies for unauthorized workers. In contrast, Agri Processor Co. v. 
NLRB,133 issued in 2008 by a District of Columbia Circuit panel, did 
so. In Agri Processor, employees had voted to join the United Food 
and Commercial Workers Union, but the company refused 
recognition on the ground that most of those who voted were not 
authorized to work.134 The issue was whether unauthorized workers 
are “employees” under the NLRA for purposes of establishing an 
employer’s duty to bargain.135 Judge David Tatel, the author of the 
court of appeals decision in Hoffman that the U.S. Supreme Court 
later overturned, wrote for the Agri Processor majority. Rejecting the 
employer’s two main arguments, the majority held that unauthorized 
workers must be included in the NLRA and that the same bargaining 
unit may include both authorized and unauthorized workers.136 
The reasoning in Agri Processor reached back in time before 
Hoffman to the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB,137 which had held—two years before IRCA introduced federal 
employer sanctions—that unauthorized workers are employees under 
the NLRA.138 Did IRCA and Hoffman change the NLRA’s definition 
of employee as interpreted by Sure-Tan? Agri Processor reasoned 
that IRCA had not addressed the NLRA definition expressly or 
impliedly. The court also distinguished Hoffman on the ground that it 
 
 132. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In contrast, the majority was 
concerned with a different systemic effect, namely, incentives for future unauthorized workers 
to come to the United States. Thus, the majority observed that allowing backpay for Castro 
“would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone 
prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations.” Id. at 151 (majority 
opinion). 
 133. Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 134. Id. at 2. 
 135. Id. at 2–8. 
 136. Id. at 8–9. 
 137. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 138. Id. at 891–92. 
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addressed only remedies, and not the coverage of NLRA generally.139 
This formal distinction, however, mattered much less than a basic 
difference between Agri Processor and the Hoffman majority in 
understanding the relationship between immigration law and labor 
law. 
Addressing the rights of unauthorized workers, Judge Tatel 
discussed the interests of workers, authorized and unauthorized alike. 
He found that immigration law status is not relevant to determining 
whether workers in the same workplace share a “community of 
interest,” which is the NLRB’s test for defining bargaining units.140 
Tatel reasoned that, with respect to “wages, benefits, skills, duties, 
working conditions, and supervision of the 
employee, . . . undocumented workers and legal workers in a 
bargaining unit are identical.”141 He continued, “While undocumented 
aliens may face penalties for violating immigration laws, they receive 
the same wages and benefits as legal workers, face the same working 
conditions, answer to the same supervisors, and possess the same 
skills and duties.”142 
Agri Processor and the Hoffman dissent—which both stand in 
sharp contrast to the approach of the Hoffman majority—articulated 
a relationship between immigration law and workplace law that 
emphasizes the practical ties between unauthorized migrants and 
other persons whose welfare depends on how the law treats the 
unauthorized. Agri Processor reasoned that excluding unauthorized 
workers from labor organizing under the NRLA can harm coworkers 
who are U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or otherwise 
working lawfully.143 The Hoffman dissent reasoned that failure to fully 
enforce the NRLA would incentivize employers to hire unauthorized 
workers, thus undermining the workplace welfare (or the jobs) of 
citizens and lawful noncitizens.144 According to this view, the interests 
of all workers in the workplace community of interest may depend on 
how unauthorized workers are treated. 
 
 139. Agri Processor, 514 F.3d at 3–8. 
 140. Id. at 8–9. 
 141. Id. at 9. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 7–8. 
 144. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153–56 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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To generalize, these citizen and lawful noncitizen workers act as 
interest surrogates, or as citizen proxies for unauthorized workers.145 
The existence of these citizen proxy workers—even if based on the 
U.S. labor market generally—is essential to the rationale for 
workplace protections and remedies for noncitizens who work in 
violation of immigration law. Citizen proxy arguments, like 
institutional competence arguments, allow unauthorized migrants to 
assert rights indirectly and obliquely.146 
Citizen proxies are also invoked elsewhere in the law governing 
immigration and immigrants. In federal immigration law, for 
example, the interests of any U.S.-citizen children may influence the 
decision whether to remove noncitizen parents from the United 
States.147 Evidence of sufficient hardship to children, and sometimes 
to parents and siblings who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent 
residents, may be a factor that blocks deportation. Though it is not 
easy to meet the threshold eligibility requirements for these forms of 
relief, or to persuade the decisionmaker to exercise discretion 
favorably, a significant number of unauthorized migrants can seek 
relief through a child as a citizen proxy.148 The statutory vehicles are 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provisions that give 
executive branch officials the discretionary authority to allow a 
parent to stay.149 These federal immigration law provisions, like the 
Agri Processor interpretation of federal labor law, allow citizen 
proxies to give expression to the rights of unauthorized migrants. 
Consistent with the purpose of this Article as an analysis of 
emerging patterns, I am not suggesting that citizen proxy arguments 
on behalf of unauthorized migrants are successful consistently or even 
 
 145. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 116, at 1389 (explaining how excluding 
unauthorized workers would undermine the purpose of the FLSA). 
 146. Comparative culpability arguments work together with citizen proxy arguments when 
concerns about harms to citizens are heightened because certain employers are identified as 
especially culpable. 
 147. The statutory term for deportation is “removal.” See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a 
(2006) (setting out rules for conduct of removal proceedings). 
 148. One study found that in 2008, about four million U.S.-born children were living in 
families with at least one parent who was an unauthorized migrant, a significant increase over 
the 2.3 million in 2003. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 1, at 8. 
 149. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (providing for cancellation of removal for 
certain nonpermanent residents). Inadmissibility and deportability waivers require and assess 
hardship to a close relative who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See, e.g., INA 
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (waiver of inadmissibility for certain crimes); id. § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(i) (waiver of inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation); id. § 237, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(H) (waiver of deportability for certain misrepresentations). 
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frequently. The government rejects many applications for 
discretionary relief because they fail to show sufficient hardship to 
close relatives who are U.S. citizens.150 Many noncitizens who would 
benefit from such relief are not eligible to apply.151 Moreover, the 
mere fact that citizen children will be taken out of the country by 
their deported parents—or separated from their parents—is 
insufficient to block removal.152 This aspect of prevailing doctrine may 
reflect unease that any other rule would impede too many removals 
of noncitizens who are otherwise deportable, given that the 
Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship on virtually all children 
born on U.S. soil regardless of their parents’ immigration law status.153 
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to consider the 
constitutional claims of U.S. citizens adversely affected by 
government decisions on admission and expulsion.154 Notwithstanding 
 
 150. See, e.g., In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 322 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a 
noncitizen did not establish eligibility for cancellation of removal because she failed to 
demonstrate that her children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship from 
her deportation); In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding the 
respondent not eligible for cancellation of removal because he did not establish that his children 
or parents would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he was deported). 
 151. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (requiring ten years of continuous 
physical presence for eligibility to apply for cancellation of removal). 
 152. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157–58 (3d Cir. 1977). The federal government 
removed over 108,000 parents of U.S.-citizen children between 1997 and 2008. See OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NO. OIG-09-15, REMOVALS 
INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 5–6 (2009), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-15_Jan09.pdf. 
 153. See Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 489 (1987) 
(reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENS WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)). There is a narrow exception for parents who are 
diplomats representing foreign governments in the United States. See ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN, 
MOTOMURA & FULLERTON, supra note 2, at 15–44. For a contrary reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra (presenting arguments that the Fourteenth 
Amendment denies jus soli citizenship to U.S.-born children of unauthorized migrants). 
 154. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), tested the denial of a visa to the Belgian 
Marxist scholar Ernst Mandel. Id. at 759. He sued, joined by several professors who had invited 
him to speak at universities in the United States. Id. at 759–60. The plaintiffs claimed that 
excluding Mandel due to ideology violated their First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association. Id. at 760. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), several families sued to challenge a 
federal immigration statute that defined “child” to include the children of unwed mothers, but 
not unwed fathers. Id. at 788–91. Some plaintiffs were citizens and lawful permanent residents 
who sought to be reunited with their families. Id. at 790. The Supreme Court rejected both 
constitutional challenges, declining to take seriously the argument that denying admission to 
noncitizens can hurt citizens. Id. at 794–95; Mandel, 408 U.S. at 768–70. Several scholars have 
discussed the relevance of effects on citizens to constitutional challenges to government 
immigration decisions. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 373, 374 (2004) (arguing that an alien-centered approach to constitutional immigration 
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these counterexamples in immigration law, however, this inquiry into 
workplace protections shows that, even if unauthorized migrants 
cannot directly assert their rights as fully as they could if they were 
U.S. citizens, a decision like Agri Processor opens the door for 
indirect recognition of their rights through citizen proxy arguments. 
C. Procedural Surrogates 
Another pattern is distinct but closely related to institutional 
competence, comparative culpability, and citizen proxy arguments. 
This fourth pattern consists of what I call procedural surrogate 
arguments. I use this term to refer to judicial reliance on the rhetoric 
of procedure and a traditional procedural rule to recognize the rights 
of an unauthorized worker, even when principles of labor law or some 
other substantive body of law might suggest that the worker’s claims 
would be rejected.155 Procedural surrogates can operate closely in 
conjunction with some of the other patterns that I have examined, 
including institutional competence arguments and citizen proxy 
arguments. 
An instructive example is Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd.,156 decided in 
2007 by the California Court of Appeals. At stake was a California 
statute, adopted in response to Hoffman, that made immigration law 
status irrelevant to the enforcement of state labor and employment 
laws.157 Reyes arose when an employee claimed unpaid wages, and the 
employer sought discovery on the employee’s immigration law 
status.158 The employee then invoked this statute limiting evidence 
 
law ignores the possibility that immigration law may injure citizens); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose 
Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, Review Essay, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1567, 1584–86, 1601–02 (1997) (arguing for a focus on both aliens’ rights and citizens’ rights in 
deciding questions of constitutional immigration law); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: 
Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1946–52 (1996) (book 
review) (arguing for a national self-definition model of constitutional immigration law that 
focuses on the rights of U.S. citizens and permanent residents). 
 155. For a discussion of analogous procedural surrogates in the constitutional aspects of 
immigration law, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: 
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). 
 156. Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 148 Cal. App. 4th 604 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 157. That statute was section 1171.5 of the California Labor Code, which provides: 
For purposes of enforcing state labor and employment laws, a person’s immigration 
status is irrelevant to the issue of liability, and in proceedings or discovery undertaken 
to enforce those state laws no inquiry shall be permitted into a person’s immigration 
status except where the person seeking to make this inquiry has shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that the inquiry is necessary in order to comply with federal 
immigration law. 
 158. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 608–09. 
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and civil discovery. The employer argued in turn that Hoffman, by 
making remedies for work law violations depend on immigration law 
status, preempted the statute.159 In Reyes, the California Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument and upheld the state statute.160 In 
doing so, the decision indirectly recognized the rights of unauthorized 
migrants in several ways that operated together. 
Reyes interwove elements of arguments based on citizen proxies, 
institutional competence, and procedural surrogates. First, it included 
the same sort of citizen proxy argument that appears in the Hoffman 
dissent and in Agri Processor. In Reyes, the court expressed concern 
about the systemic effects on the workplace of allowing employers to 
pay employees substandard wages.161 
Second, by affording unauthorized workers protection in a rule 
of relevance, Reyes articulated workplace protections using a vehicle 
of traditional procedure. This indirect recognition of rights came in 
the form of a procedural surrogate for substantive protection under 
the California prevailing wage statute. Perhaps anticipating the 
objection that state law workplace remedies for unauthorized workers 
run afoul of federal immigration law as applied to the workplace by 
Hoffman, the California Labor Code safeguards wages through a 
procedural rule, not a stronger articulation of the substantive right to 
the prevailing wage.162 
Closely tied to the use of a procedural surrogate in Reyes is a 
third noteworthy analytical element: an institutional competence 
argument. In essence, Reyes decided that state law should govern an 
employer-employee dispute, federal immigration law should not 
curtail state law remedies, and a state rule of evidence could drive this 
analysis.163 This reasoning reflects reliance not only on a procedural 
surrogate but also on an institutional competence argument—though 
not the same type of institutional competence argument that has 
 
 159. Id. at 617. Of course, preemption was not an issue in Hoffman, which addressed the 
relationship between two federal statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 104–12. 
 160. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 615–18. 
 161. Id. at 617–18. 
 162. For robust use of discovery as a procedural surrogate that is similar but less explicit, see 
Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), which denied discovery of employees’ 
immigration status in a Title VII suit against their employer, id. at 1074. On privacy as a barrier 
to formal discovery of immigration and citizenship status, see Anil Kalhan, The Fourth 
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1137, 1185–88 (2008). 
 163. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 608–19. 
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invalidated state and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants. 
Recall that the institutional competence argument in City of Hazleton 
was a preemption argument against state and local authority.164 In 
Reyes, institutional competence argued against preemption and in 
favor of state law.165 States have institutional competence not only to 
govern procedure in their own courts, but also to regulate 
employment. Making the latter point, the Reyes court said that 
“[b]ecause legislation providing for the payment of prevailing wages 
comes under the historic police powers of the state, the presumption 
is that legislation is not superseded by the IRCA.”166 This statement is 
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions characterizing 
employment as an area of traditional state regulation. 
D. The Effectiveness of Oblique Rights in the Workplace 
Why should arguments based on comparative culpability, citizen 
proxies, procedural surrogates, and institutional competence 
sometimes allow unauthorized migrants to assert their workplace 
rights obliquely? The answer to this question starts by identifying a 
spectrum of ways to understand and argue for the rights of 
unauthorized migrants. 
At one end of the spectrum are pragmatic arguments that 
implicitly concede that unauthorized migrants’ claims of right are 
weak, but emphasize that any refusal to sustain their claims will 
adversely affect persons with stronger claims. Consider the arguments 
that were typically made by opponents of California’s Proposition 
187. Had a federal court not found federal preemption, Proposition 
187 would have barred access by unauthorized migrants to most state 
public services, including nonemergency health care and public 
education.167 
 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 37–42. 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 156–60. 
 166. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 616. 
 167. Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and Reporting., Proposition 
187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE, CAL. GOV’T 
CODE, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, CAL. PENAL CODE and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE). It 
also would have required certain state and local government employees to verify the 
immigration status of persons whom they encountered in their duties, and to report all 
suspected unauthorized migrants to federal immigration officials. In addition, Proposition 187 
introduced substantial new criminal penalties for manufacturing, selling, and using false 
documents. A federal court found that all but the criminal penalties were preempted. See 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786–87 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The 
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As Professor Linda Bosniak has analyzed, the arguments against 
Proposition 187 “emphasiz[ed] the initiative’s negative consequences 
for Americans’ own self-interest”168—for example, that denying health 
care to the unauthorized population would jeopardize the public 
health of all Californians, including U.S. citizens.169 These were 
pragmatic arguments. In contrast, moral arguments on behalf of the 
unauthorized migrants were rarely heard in the debate.170 
Like pragmatic public health arguments against Proposition 187, 
the arguments based on comparative culpability and citizen proxies 
are pragmatic—though pragmatic in the context of judicial 
decisionmaking rather than the political arena that Bosniak analyzed. 
These pragmatic arguments appeal in the workplace setting to 
concerns about the broader consequences if judges decline to 
recognize certain rights of unauthorized migrants. In the Hoffman 
dissent, the citizen proxies were lawful workers in general, who might 
have been adversely affected if employers had incentives to hire 
unauthorized workers instead.171 Comparative culpability arguments 
appeal to the same concerns about the potential adverse effects on 
lawful workers of letting egregious employer behavior go unchecked. 
But these arguments for workplace rights can be more focused 
than the pragmatic arguments against Proposition 187, or those in the 
Hoffman dissent. The citizen proxies in Agri Processor were in the 
same workplace,172 and thus more specifically identifiable as directly 
affected if the NLRA scheme for organizing and collective bargaining 
excluded unauthorized workers in the same plant. And in the 
immigration law settings that I have described, citizen proxies are 
individually identifiable as directly affected because they lay the 
foundation for discretionary relief from removal. 
These pragmatic arguments allow unauthorized migrants’ 
workplace rights to be recognized indirectly in ways that function like 
institutional competence arguments in the context of challenging state 
 
case settled while on appeal. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Talks Offered Davis Few 
Choices, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at A3. 
 168. Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National 
Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 558 (1996). 
 169. Id. at 563. 
 170. See id. at 563, 566. 
 171. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153–56 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 144. 
 172. Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 133–43. 
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and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants. Relevant again is 
pervasive ambivalence about immigration law enforcement, this time 
in the workplace. The impulse in recent years to ramp up 
enforcement efforts is in tension with the enduring reality that 
migrant labor represents a crucial component of economic growth. 
Federal law did not prohibit hiring unauthorized workers until 1986,173 
when IRCA introduced employer sanctions,174 which have been 
ineffective. Fake green cards and other false documents are readily 
available,175 and employers only need to check if an identity or work 
authorization document “reasonably appears on its face to be 
genuine.”176 As long as employers check documents and do the 
paperwork, their risk of liability under the statute is minimal.177 
Further probing only opens them to discrimination claims.178 
Worksite enforcement is evolving rapidly. A few years ago, 
unauthorized work was virtually never detected because enforcement 
relied on workplace raids, which rarely took place.179 This changed in 
 
 173. In 1952, Congress made it a felony to harbor an alien unlawfully in the United States 
and expanded the Border Patrol’s enforcement authority. At the insistence of southwestern 
growers and other agricultural interests, Congress added the so-called Texas Proviso, which 
excluded the employment of an unauthorized worker from the definition of harboring. Act of 
June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 163, 228–29; see also ROGER DANIELS, 
GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 
1882, at 121 (2004) (discussing the background of the Texas Proviso); MOTOMURA, supra note 
7, at 177 (same); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 
CONTROL IN AMERICA 194 (2002) (same). When IRCA became law in 1986, at least twelve 
states had some kind of employer sanctions law. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & 
REFUGEE POL’Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT 
OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 565 (1981). 
 174. See INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006) (prohibiting employment of unauthorized 
aliens). 
 175. See Wayne A. Cornelius, The U.S. Demand for Mexican Labor, in MEXICAN 
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 25, 43–
44 (Wayne A. Cornelius & Jorge A. Bustamante eds., 1989) (surveying California employers 
who describe the ease with which undocumented workers attain false identification). 
 176. INA § 274A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); see also Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. 
INS, 948 F.2d 549, 553–54 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the employer did not violate 
§ 1324a(b)(1)(A) by failing to closely inspect the employee’s social security card or compare it 
to an example in the INS handbook, and observing that “Congress intended to minimize the 
burden and the risk placed on the employer in the verification process”). 
 177. See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of 
White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1046–55, 1057, 1060 (1990) (describing 
employer reactions to IRCA sanctions and illustrating the degree to which employers are, 
paradoxically, protected by IRCA despite their employment of undocumented workers). 
 178. INA § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6). This requires discriminatory intent. Id. 
 179. See Lack of Worksite Enforcement and Employer Sanctions: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
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the winter of 2006–2007, when worksite enforcement surged 
upward.180 In one highly publicized case in the last year of President 
George W. Bush’s administration, the federal government brought 
criminal charges against unauthorized workers arrested at a meat 
packing plant in Postville, Iowa.181 The Obama administration has 
shifted policy priorities away from workplace raids to aggressive 
checks for unauthorized workers using electronic databases.182 
The recent upsurge in worksite enforcement has not changed the 
U.S. economy’s overall reliance on over seven million unauthorized 
workers, an estimated 5 percent of the total U.S. workforce. The 
percentage is much higher in certain occupations and industries.183 As 
long as the lawful admission scheme remains unable to provide a 
steady supply of workers, employers in the U.S. economy will depend 
heavily on the availability of an unauthorized workforce,184 and 
employers will push back if government enforcement becomes too 
strict.185 
 
Cong. 7 (2005) (testimony of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office) (describing how worksite enforcement was and continues 
to be a low priority for federal government agencies); JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION 
GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE “ILLEGAL ALIEN” AND THE MAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO 
BOUNDARY 136 (2002) (discussing the low number of workplace inspectors and enforcement 
actions in the late 1990s). 
 180. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement Fact Sheet, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (showing the 
total worksite enforcement arrests increasing from 1,292 in 2005 to 4,383 in 2006, 4,940 in 2007, 
and 6,287 in 2008). 
 181. For a discussion of the Postville raid and an analysis of the trend toward criminal 
prosecution of unauthorized migrants, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 21–56, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 182. See Neil A. Lewis, In Search for Illegal Workers, Immigration Officials Will Audit More 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A14 (describing the Obama administration’s use of 
electronic databases to check for unauthorized workers); Julia Preston, Immigrant Crackdown 
Leads to 1,800 Pink Slips, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at A1 (describing the Obama 
administration’s emphasis on forcing employers to dismiss employees instead of raiding 
workplaces). 
 183. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 1, at 14–17 (presenting data showing that 
unauthorized immigrant workers remain overrepresented in low wage and low education 
occupations). 
 184. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of 
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 223 (noting the 
U.S. economy’s dependence on immigrants from Mexico and Latin America). 
 185. See Julia Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 2008, at A1 (“Under pressure from the toughest crackdown on illegal immigration in two 
decades, employers across the country are fighting back in state legislatures, the federal courts 
and city halls.”). 
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As long as fundamental ambivalence about enforcement 
continues to prevail, it is an unsurprising middle ground for the rights 
of unauthorized workers to be incomplete but recognized. And to the 
extent that these citizen proxy arguments and comparative culpability 
arguments reflect pragmatic concerns, they can join forces with 
institutional competence and procedural surrogate arguments, both of 
which allow judges to give expression to those concerns. This is not 
only a way to protect the interests of citizens and lawfully present 
noncitizens in the same workplace but also—as with unauthorized 
migrants who are targeted by state and local laws—a way to recognize 
their inevitable membership in those work-based communities 
despite their status outside the law. 
III.  SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Raids on homes, worksites, and other venues have always been 
an immigration enforcement tool, but they have become more 
frequent since about 2006.186 Though the Obama administration has 
shifted away from workplace raids, a political imperative remains to 
show a strong enforcement face to help lay the foundation for 
comprehensive immigration reform. Many arrests and searches have 
been found to violate the Fourth Amendment, and yet they uncover 
evidence that is probative as to an arrested individual’s immigration 
law status and thus as to whether she is potentially subject to removal 
from the United States.187 
The government will seek to introduce this evidence in 
immigration court, where an immigration judge will decide 
removability and rule on any relief that may be available. The 
noncitizen’s attorney (if the noncitizen has one) may file a motion to 
suppress. May the government introduce evidence obtained through a 
search and seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment? Though this 
question affects a full range of noncitizens, including lawful 
permanent residents and lawfully present nonimmigrants, my focus 
here, as throughout this Article, is unauthorized migrants. 
This inquiry into remedies for unlawful searches and seizures fills 
in the picture drawn in Parts I and II of the patterns of oblique rights 
 
 186. In fiscal year 2002, the federal government arrested 510 unauthorized workers and 
employers in workplace raids. Worksite arrests rose to 1,292 in fiscal year 2005 and then leapt to 
4,940 in 2007. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 180. 
 187. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings held by the INS). 
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asserted by unauthorized migrants. Courts have granted remedies in 
this context to unauthorized migrants, sometimes by sustaining 
arguments whose success is traceable to comparative culpability 
arguments, citizen proxy arguments, and institutional competence 
arguments. Part III also uncovers one new pattern: reliance on 
subconstitutional reasoning to reach—even if less boldly—practically 
the same results as if unauthorized migrants were the constitutional 
equals of U.S. citizens. By “subconstitutional,” I mean an argument 
based on statutes, regulations, or other sources of law less fixed than 
the U.S. Constitution. 
As was true of the patterns that emerged in the topics in Parts I 
and II, all of these patterns of oblique rights involving search and 
seizure are related in terms of their practical effect. And as with 
successful arguments for unauthorized migrants’ workplace rights, the 
persuasiveness of these arguments depends on pragmatic, rather than 
moral, reasoning. These arguments rely on the consequences of 
Fourth Amendment violations—and unlawful law enforcement 
practices generally—on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents 
either because they will be arrested or searched, or because they have 
close connections to noncitizens who will be arrested or searched. 
Again, the integration of unauthorized migrants into U.S. society lays 
the foundation for oblique rights. 
A. Egregious Violations, Comparative Culpability, and Citizen 
Proxies 
The baseline rule for remedies in immigration proceedings for a 
Fourth Amendment violation comes from the 1984 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,188 in which the Court held 
that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in deportation 
proceedings.189 Justice O’Connor’s reasoning on behalf of a bare 
majority of five Justices relied on weighing ‘‘the likely social benefits 
of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs.’’190 A 
major element of her reasoning was skepticism about the benefits of 
excluding evidence. O’Connor observed that deportation would still 
be possible in many cases without evidence from the arrest, few 
enforcement officers would expect challenges to the circumstances of 
the arrest, the government has its own scheme to deter Fourth 
 
 188. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
 189. Id. at 1050. 
 190. Id. at 1041. 
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Amendment violations, and alternative private remedies are 
available.191 She then noted the ‘‘unusual and significant’’ costs of an 
exclusionary rule, among them the cost of ‘‘requir[ing] the courts to 
close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law,’’ thus complicating 
the system of deportation proceedings.192 
Justice O’Connor also wrote that the Court’s “conclusions 
concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there 
developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations 
by INS officers were widespread.”193 And she noted, “we do not deal 
here with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other 
liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and 
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”194 Three 
other Justices joined this part of her opinion mentioning egregious 
violations. Presumably, the four dissenters would agree, given that 
they would have applied the exclusionary rule to all Fourth 
Amendment violations.195 
Subsequent federal appeals courts have granted motions to 
suppress evidence obtained through egregious violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. These decisions vary in reasoning and result, but 
several consistent elements have emerged. Most significantly, the 
federal courts of appeals have almost uniformly found that it 
constitutes an egregious violation to rely improperly on race or 
ethnicity in conducting a search or seizure. 
The foundational case addressing reliance on race and ethnicity 
in conducting a search or seizure is the 1975 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.196 That case held that 
immigration agents may not effect an investigative seizure of 
suspected unauthorized migrants solely because of their “apparent 
Mexican ancestry.”197 More generally, the Ninth Circuit considers a 
Fourth Amendment violation egregious if committed “deliberately or 
by conduct a reasonable officer should have known would violate the 
Constitution.”198 Applying this standard in light of Brignoni-Ponce 
 
 191. Id. at 1043–45. 
 192. Id. at 1046, 1048–50. 
 193. Id. at 1050. 
 194. Id. at 1050–51. 
 195. See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 196. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 197. Id. at 885–86. 
 198. Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 493. 
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and similar decisions, a violation is egregious if an enforcement 
decision is based on race, ethnicity, or nationality.199 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit has excluded, based on egregious violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, evidence gathered when a vehicle was stopped solely 
based on the passengers’ Hispanic appearance200 and when a 
noncitizen’s apartment was entered and searched, without consent or 
a warrant, solely because he had a “Nigerian-sounding name.”201 The 
Second Circuit has been disinclined to consider egregious a stop that 
is not prolonged or accompanied by a show or use of force.202 But the 
Second Circuit has ruled that, even if government conduct is not 
severe, Fourth Amendment violations can be so improper as to call 
for suppression. In one case, the court observed, “were there 
evidence that the stop was based on race, the violation would be 
egregious, and the exclusionary rule would apply.”203 
Examining search and seizure cases uncovers some of the same 
patterns of indirect recognition of unauthorized migrants’ rights 
revealed in Parts I and II. First, these search and seizure decisions 
have much in common with the workplace cases in Part II. Asking if a 
Fourth Amendment violation is egregious is a question about 
comparative culpability, much like examining the degree of employer 
wrongdoing in a lost wages decision like Balbuena, Madeira, or 
Ambrosi.204 When police officers know or should know that they are 
violating the Fourth Amendment—for example, by relying on race or 
ethnicity to choose a search target—the stronger response of a 
suppression order is appropriate. To be sure, the probative nature of 
the suppressed evidence suggests a degree of noncitizen culpability 
based on unlawful presence. But by offsetting the presumption that 
 
 199. See, e.g., Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (mem.) (holding 
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not lawfully stop and question 
individuals solely on the basis of Hispanic appearance). My concern in this Article is how 
decisionmakers and litigants work within prevailing doctrine to decide on remedies once a 
violation is established. For a thorough critique of doctrine defining a Fourth Amendment 
violation—especially of what constitutes a search or seizure, and consent to a search or 
seizure—see generally Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 946 (2002). 
 200. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 201. Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 503. 
 202. See Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[E]xclusion may 
well be proper where the seizure itself is gross or unreasonable in addition to being without a 
plausible legal ground, e.g., when the initial illegal stop is particularly lengthy, there is a show or 
use of force, etc.”). 
 203. Id. at 237. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 119–29. 
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the illegality of a search does not lead to suppression of evidence, the 
egregious violation rule allows Fourth Amendment remedies when 
unauthorized migrants can show that law enforcement behavior tips 
the comparative culpability analysis to the opposite result. 
Second, suppression arguments that cite egregious Fourth 
Amendment violations operate like citizen proxy arguments. Recall 
the tension in Hoffman and in Agri Processor between an 
unauthorized worker’s individual wrongdoing and systemic 
consequences, which include effects on employer behavior as well as 
coworkers who are citizens, lawful permanent residents, or otherwise 
authorized to work.205 The need to deter unlawful conduct by law 
enforcement officers, even assuming that the individual who is the 
object of enforcement is culpable, provides much of the rationale 
behind the suppression remedy. A major part of the Court’s 
reasoning in Lopez-Mendoza was that excluding evidence would have 
insufficient deterrent value, given the availability of other measures 
to deter and correct Fourth Amendment violations.206 Like in the 
Hoffman dissent and the Agri Processor decision in the workplace 
context, courts apply the exclusionary rule to protect citizen proxies. 
The egregious violation decisions identify police misbehavior patterns 
that may harm citizens and lawfully present noncitizens directly or 
indirectly because of police officers’ use of excessive force or 
disregard of warrant requirements, or because of their improper use 
of race and ethnicity.207 
These observations about the search and seizure cases should 
recall the contrast between moral and pragmatic arguments raised in 
Part II’s discussion of citizen proxies and comparative culpability. An 
argument for suppression can become a strong moral argument based 
on an unauthorized migrant’s Fourth Amendment–based individual 
rights claim, but only when the circumstances of an illegal search or 
seizure suggest that the enforcing officer was comparatively culpable. 
More reliably, a pragmatic rationale like the need to deter unlawful 
law enforcement activity—especially racial or ethnic discrimination—
makes an argument for suppression much more persuasive. 
 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 133–46. 
 206. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043–50 (1983). 
 207. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 693–711 (2000) (discussing racial profiling by immigration officers even in 
the wake of the egregious violation decisions). 
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This pragmatic approach to remedies is consistent with Justice 
O’Connor’s observation in Lopez-Mendoza that it might be 
appropriate to revisit remedies for Fourth Amendment violations if 
evidence emerges that the government is not adequately controlling 
and supervising immigration enforcement and constitutional 
violations become widespread.208 Any such pragmatic approach to 
suppression would invoke citizen proxies, namely, citizens who may 
be harmed directly or indirectly by the same unlawful enforcement 
practices. 
B. Phantom Norm Arguments 
This inquiry into remedies for unlawful searches and seizures 
goes further than Parts I and II by revealing a fifth pattern of oblique 
rights that unauthorized migrants can assert. An unauthorized 
migrant seeking to exclude evidence from removal proceedings can 
not only invoke the egregious violation exception to Lopez-Mendoza 
but can also make a subconstitutional argument based on the 
government’s own regulations. 
An example of such subconstitutional reasoning is the February 
2009 decision by Immigration Judge Ashley Tabaddor in Matter of 
Perez-Cruz,209 which excluded evidence because ICE agents violated 
federal regulations governing arrest and interrogation during 
workplace raids.210 This use of a regulatory violation seems unusual 
but merits examination in this analysis of emerging patterns. Deciding 
suppression on subconstitutional grounds is not only logical but is also 
consistent with other patterns in immigration law in which 
constitutional reasoning has taken subconstitutional form. 
Under one of the regulations involved in Perez-Cruz, even 
briefly detaining an individual requires reasonable or individualized 
 
 208. For a detailed argument that developments since Lopez-Mendoza support application 
of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings, see generally Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason 
to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and 
the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109. 
 209. In re Perez-Cruz, No. A95 748 837 (Immigration Ct. L.A., Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), appeal 
filed. 
 210. Id., slip op. at 9–18; see also In re Herrera-Priego, No. [redacted], slip op. at 20–25 
(Immigration Ct. N.Y., N.Y. July 10, 2003), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/practiceareas/ 
immigration/pdfs/web428.pdf (suppressing evidence and terminating removal proceedings 
because the enforcement action violated the government agency’s own Operation Instructions 
on enforcement at worksites involved in a labor dispute); Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The 
Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 
389–93 (2004) (discussing Herrera-Priego). 
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suspicion that the individual is unlawfully present in the United 
States.211 Judge Tabaddor found no reasonable or individualized 
suspicion that any of the workers were unlawfully present.212 The 
raided plant was an electronic assembly facility owned and operated 
by Micro Solutions Enterprise in Van Nuys, California. The issue in 
the case was whether the workers were detained or instead free to 
walk away when about one hundred Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agents entered the plant.213 The judge found that the 
workers were detained and therefore seized when the armed and 
uniformed agents ordered all workers to stop working and gather in a 
large hallway.214 
To find a violation of law that made suppression appropriate, 
Judge Tabaddor relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals decision 
in Matter of Garcia-Flores,215 which held that removal proceedings 
may be terminated when the government violates its own regulations 
and infringes on the respondent’s rights.216 Under Garcia-Flores, a 
regulatory violation justifies termination of removal proceedings only 
if the violated regulation serves to benefit the noncitizen and the 
violation “prejudiced interests of the alien which were protected by 
the regulation.”217 Judge Tabaddor found that the Garcia-Flores 
requirements were met in Perez-Cruz.218 She thus ordered suppression 
and terminated the removal proceeding with prejudice.219 
An immigration judge’s authority to rule on issues of 
constitutional law is limited. An immigration judge may, however, 
make procedural rulings in removal proceedings as required by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, some 
immigration judges have granted suppression motions based on the 
egregious violation exception to Lopez-Mendoza.220 In contrast, 
 
 211. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)–(c) (2009). 
 212. Perez-Cruz, slip op. at 14. 
 213. Id. at 11–14. 
 214. Id. at 11–13. 
 215. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 216. Id. at 328–29. 
 217. Id. at 328 (quoting United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 
1979)). 
 218. Perez-Cruz, slip op. at 16–18. 
 219. Id. at 18. 
 220. E.g., In re Reyes-Basurto, No. [redacted], slip op. at 7–9 (Immigration Ct. N.Y., N.Y. 
May 28, 2009), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NY-5-28-
09.pdf. For a list of additional decisions, see Legal Action Ctr., Am. Immigration Council, 
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Perez-Cruz relied on a regulatory violation, adopting a 
subconstitutional rationale, which yielded the same practical result as 
the egregious violation exception.221 
Reliance on subconstitutional analogues to constitutional rules 
bears some resemblance to other, more established uses of phantom 
constitutional norms. As I have analyzed in detail in a previous 
article, this is the practice of interpreting statutes and regulations to 
avoid constitutional doubt even when the plenary power doctrine—
which ordinarily stifles constitutional judicial review—suggests that 
the court would reject a noncitizen’s constitutional challenge to a 
government decision pertaining to admission or expulsion.222 Over the 
past twenty years, arguing for a phantom norm decision has gradually 
become a standard strategy in litigation challenging government 
immigration decisions. The success of this strategy no doubt prompts 
plaintiffs in such cases to press such arguments when they can. 
Several U.S. Supreme Court cases have invalidated government 
decisions not on constitutional grounds, but by interpreting statutes to 
avoid serious constitutional questions. Prominent among them are the 
Court’s 2001 decisions in Zadvydas v. Davis223 and INS v. St. Cyr.224 
Zadvydas involved the indefinite detention of former permanent 
resident noncitizens who had been ordered removed from the United 
States but who could not be sent anywhere because no country would 
accept them, not even their own country of citizenship.225 The 
Supreme Court held that the INA did not authorize the government 
to detain a noncitizen indefinitely, thus avoiding a decision on the 
constitutionality of the indefinite detention of these noncitizens.226 In 
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that the INA did not eliminate the 
 
Enforcement, Motions to Suppress, http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation-
issue-pages/enforcement-motions-suppress (last visited Feb. 19, 2010). 
 221. Perez-Cruz, slip op. at 17. 
 222. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). Examples of 
phantom norm decisionmaking include interpretation of both statutes and regulations. See, e.g., 
id. at 570–71, 590–92 (discussing the interpretation of regulations in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 
(1985), and Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)). 
 223. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). I should disclose that I served as a volunteer 
consultant for the attorneys representing Kim Ho Ma, one of the petitioners in Zadvydas. 
 224. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). I should disclose that I co-authored an amicus 
curiae brief in In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 1996), which first posed some of the 
issues that St. Cyr later decided. 
 225. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86. 
 226. Id. at 696–99. 
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jurisdiction of federal courts sitting in habeas corpus to review 
removal orders, thus avoiding the question whether the abrogation of 
habeas jurisdiction would violate the Suspension Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.227 
Perez-Cruz is an example of phantom norm decisionmaking. The 
prevailing view is that the Fourth Amendment applies to interior 
enforcement of the immigration laws against noncitizens who are in 
the United States unlawfully.228 But Lopez-Mendoza curtailed the 
practical protections of the Fourth Amendment by limiting the 
remedies available in a certain type of proceeding in a certain type of 
forum—removal proceedings in immigration court—that uniquely 
involves noncitizens and especially affects unauthorized migrants.229 
Put more generally, constitutional doctrine evolved to create a 
significant gap between the Fourth Amendment rights of 
unauthorized migrants and those of U.S. citizens. In Perez-Cruz, as in 
other applications of phantom norms, an unauthorized migrant who 
could not directly demand a constitutional remedy could do so 
indirectly by securing a subconstitutional remedy, based here on a 
regulatory violation.230 
 
 227. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308. 
 228. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990), might be read to suggest that unauthorized migrants lack constitutional protections 
without some showing of connections to the United States. See id. at 271 (“These 
cases . . . establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country.”). A few decisions have taken this suggestion seriously, but they seem to be outliers. 
See United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1273 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that 
“Ezparza-Mendoza—as a previously deported felon—lacks sufficient connection to this country 
to assert a Fourth Amendment suppression claim”); United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-
40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *16–18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997) (“The salient 
issue . . . is whether defendant Guitterez has developed substantial connections with this 
country . . . .”); Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 n.1 (Tex. App. 1991) (“We do not believe 
that the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . apply to such illegal aliens, unless they have 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered a part of the community.”). 
 229. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984). 
 230. Perez-Cruz contrasts superficially with Zadvydas, where the threshold application of 
the arguably relevant constitutional provision was in doubt. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696–97. The 
issue in Perez-Cruz was not the application of the Fourth Amendment, but rather the remedy 
for violations. In re Perez-Cruz, No. A95 748 837, slip op. at 16–18 (Immigration Ct. L.A., Cal. 
Feb. 9, 2009), appeal filed. In both cases, however, a subconstitutional decision reached a result 
that was more favorable for the noncitizen than a constitutional holding would have provided. 
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C. Phantom Norms, Institutional Competence, and Citizen Proxies 
Phantom norm arguments are closely related to institutional 
competence arguments. The suppression cases that rely on phantom 
norms to remedy Fourth Amendment violations reflect some of the 
same values that underlie institutional competence arguments, such 
as preemption in the decisions on state and local laws. Teasing out the 
connection requires comparing the subconstitutional version of the 
exclusionary rule in Perez-Cruz with the constitutional remedy 
available if a court applied the egregious conduct exception, or if the 
Supreme Court abrogated the general rule in Lopez-Mendoza. 
Regulations appear to be a less robust form of law than statutes, 
let alone constitutional provisions, because administrative agencies 
can reverse regulations without congressional involvement. In 
practical terms, however, regulations are more robust than they first 
appear in setting standards for government conduct, and thus in 
establishing the rights of unauthorized migrants. The key here is the 
value of transparency and deliberation in setting the regulatory 
standard, and then in preserving that standard against erosion or 
repeal. This is similar to a clear statement requirement, which 
provides that Congress may enact retroactive deportability grounds, 
but must do so clearly.231 This requirement facilitates public awareness 
about the legislative threat and allows those concerned about 
retroactivity to make their objections heard. This shift from litigation 
to politics need not diminish—and may even enhance—the rights of 
unauthorized migrants in practical effect. In this regard, phantom 
constitutional norms are closely related to institutional competence 
arguments. Both types of inchoate rights rely on transparency, 
deliberation, and structural requirements such as notice-and-
comment procedures to offer some degree of protection to 
unauthorized migrants. 
The search and seizure cases also resume a thread on race and 
ethnicity from Part I’s inquiry into state and local laws by showing 
how unauthorized migrants can use various arguments to suppress 
evidence from an unlawful search or seizure that may be 
discriminatory. Recall that equal protection challenges to laws that 
disadvantage noncitizens based on their unlawful immigration status 
 
 231. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315–17 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has 
affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that 
it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 272–73 (1994))). 
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have little or no traction outside of access to public K–12 education. 
And it is very hard to sustain an equal protection challenge to such 
laws based on race or ethnic discrimination, because courts require 
proof of intent to discriminate by race or ethnicity. Some courts have 
instead struck down state and local laws on institutional competence 
grounds—especially that of federal preemption.232 
In some situations, courts may recognize the rights of 
unauthorized migrants under the Fourth Amendment as an 
alternative to both equal protection and preemption. Like 
preemption, a Fourth Amendment challenge channels concerns about 
discrimination away from the unreceptive form of a broad challenge 
to a state or local policy—for example, the equal protection argument 
that failed in City of Hazleton.233 But the law of Fourth Amendment 
remedies—whether based on egregious violations or regulatory 
violations—can recognize the improper use of race or ethnicity in 
ways that differ from preemption. Most significantly, Fourth 
Amendment remedies can rely on evidence pertaining to a single 
incident, not needing the broader allegations that defeating a state or 
local law might require. 
The availability of Fourth Amendment remedies can make a 
difference partly because not all courts find state or local decisions 
preempted, but also because preemption does not apply to federal 
immigration enforcement at all. Those who challenge state and local 
laws and practices that target unauthorized migrants may try equal 
protection and preemption challenges that are harder to win but 
broader in systemic effect if successful. Or they may try a Fourth 
Amendment argument that may be easier to prove but narrower in its 
direct effect, literally limited to an individual case. 
More generally, this Part’s inquiry into search and seizure—like 
the inquiries into state and local laws and workplace rights—shows 
how unauthorized migrants have oblique rights that indirectly and 
incompletely correspond to the rights that U.S. citizens or lawful 
permanent residents may assert in the same circumstances. And once 
again, these patterns of argument reflect a degree of integration of 
these unauthorized migrants into U.S. society despite their formal 
position outside the law. But in contrast to the workplace integration 
that was key to the patterns discussed in Part II, the integration that 
matters for similar patterns in search and seizure is integration more 
 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 50–61. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 37–42. 
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broadly into communities that consist of citizens and noncitizens, 
some of whom are in the United States lawfully, and some of whom 
are not. 
IV.  THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not support 
a right to counsel in immigration proceedings, according to long-
standing precedent. The doctrinal reason is that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently found that deportation is not criminal 
punishment.234 Were the law otherwise, indigent noncitizens in 
removal proceedings would be appointed counsel at no cost, the same 
way that indigent criminal defendants are appointed public defenders. 
Absent Sixth Amendment protection, any right to counsel in 
immigration proceedings must be based on the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process of law. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
declared as a general proposition that the Fifth Amendment applies 
to all persons on U.S. territory.235 But no judicial decision has 
interpreted the U.S. Constitution to require as a general rule that 
noncitizens in removal proceedings be appointed counsel. The closest 
that any court has come to requiring this is the Sixth Circuit’s 1975 
decision in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS,236 which held that the 
Constitution requires the appointment of counsel if necessary for 
“fundamental fairness.”237 But research reveals no reported decision 
that has invoked this or any similar test to decide that counsel should 
be appointed. Reflecting the prevailing interpretations of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments, the INA and its accompanying regulations 
 
 234. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“A deportation proceeding is a purely civil 
action . . . .”); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960) (“[D]eportation proceedings are 
not subject to the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions.”); Galvan v. Press, 347 
U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (“Deportation . . . has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a 
criminal procedure.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893) (“‘Deportation’ is the removal of an alien out of the 
country . . . without any punishment . . . .”). 
 235. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–16 (1982) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment protects aliens 
whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal 
Government.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this 
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [Fifth Amendment] protection.”). 
 236. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 
(1976). 
 237. Id. at 569. 
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provide that noncitizens in removal proceedings have a right to 
counsel, but not at the government’s expense.238 
Constitutional doctrine on the right to appointed counsel seems 
settled, notwithstanding cogent objections voiced by many.239 Given 
this clarity, the most contentious questions in recent years have 
involved not the presence or absence of appointed counsel but what 
happens when counsel is ineffective. This topic is the fourth and final 
inquiry of this Article: Is there a right to effective counsel in removal 
proceedings in immigration court? This Part shows how unauthorized 
migrants, whose right to counsel does not stand on equal footing with 
that of citizens or lawfully present noncitizens, may nevertheless 
assert their rights indirectly and obliquely. 
One might ask how much this inquiry concerns unauthorized 
migrants at all, just as one might ask if examining the exclusionary 
rule in immigration proceedings addresses the rights of unauthorized 
migrants. To be sure, noncitizens who face potential removal from the 
United States in immigration proceedings include lawful permanent 
residents who may have become deportable for a variety of reasons, 
such as being convicted of a crime.240 But many noncitizens in 
immigration court proceedings who appear to lack lawful status in the 
United States may nevertheless be eligible for discretionary relief 
resulting in lawful immigration status, including permanent 
residence.241 For these unauthorized migrants, the contours of any 
right to effective counsel can make a big difference. 
Although the right to effective counsel has great practical 
significance for unauthorized migrants, this inquiry differs from 
inquiries into state and local laws, workplace protections, and search 
and seizure. The difference arises in that the right to effective counsel 
depends more directly on the meaning of unlawful presence as a 
threshold issue. Part I noted that, in deciding whether subfederal laws 
are preempted, courts might consider that even those who clearly lack 
lawful immigration status may never be removed from the United 
 
 238. INA § 240(b)(4)A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006). 
 239. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 4 (2007) (explaining problems associated with the fact that a noncitizen “will never 
have the right to appointed counsel”); LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring 
Competent Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 123, 150–68 (2009) 
(discussing problems attributable to the absence of appointed counsel in immigration 
proceedings). 
 240. See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). 
 241. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
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States. This was a key element in the reasoning in both City of 
Hazleton242 and Plyler.243 But Part I assumed generally that the 
noncitizens affected by the state and local laws under discussion are 
unauthorized migrants. Similarly, Part II assumed that the noncitizens 
seeking the contested workplace protections are unauthorized 
migrants. 
The search and seizure cases in Part III are slightly different, 
because the core issue of suppression of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment arises in the context of removal 
proceedings. In this context, unlike in the context of state and local 
law enforcement and workplace protections, the issue of unlawful 
immigration status is contested—for that is the very purpose of a 
removal proceeding. Part III, however, assumed that the evidence 
sought to be suppressed in removal proceedings is probative of 
alienage or immigration law status, often by tending to prove 
unlawful presence. This assumption frames the question as whether 
probative evidence should nonetheless be suppressed because the 
government obtained it illegally. In this sense, Part III focused on 
unauthorized migrants. 
This Part differs from the preceding three Parts in that it is not 
clear that noncitizens who assert a right to effective counsel are 
unauthorized migrants. For this reason, the right to effective counsel 
is not just a right of an unauthorized migrant, but is also a right to 
contest that characterization. But the remedies afforded to 
unauthorized migrants for ineffective assistance of counsel reflect 
patterns of argument closely related to those discussed in Parts I, II, 
and III. As a result, examining the right to effective counsel leads to a 
more textured understanding of institutional competence and citizen 
proxy arguments. Examining the right to counsel thus further 
elucidates how the legal system conceptualizes the rights of 
unauthorized migrants generally. 
A. Defining the Right 
In 2009, questions about a right to effective counsel in removal 
proceedings came to a head in the case of Matter of Compean,244 
 
 242. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 531–32 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, 
No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008); see also supra Part I. 
 243. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982); see also supra Part I. 
 244. In re Compean (Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009). 
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which prompted the rare intervention of two attorneys general of the 
United States, one of whom reversed his predecessor.245 The case 
grew out of three separate removal proceedings in immigration 
court.246 One respondent, Enrique Salas Compean, entered the United 
States unlawfully in 1989.247 Fifteen years later, Compean was placed 
in a removal proceeding in which he sought cancellation of removal—
a form of case-by-case discretionary relief that can confer lawful 
permanent resident status on a noncitizen present in the United 
States unlawfully.248 The second respondent, Sylla Bangaly, had been 
lawfully admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant but was 
placed in removal proceedings when he overstayed his admission.249 
The third respondent was an asylum applicant, known as J-E-C-, who 
was admitted to the United States for a six-month period but then 
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection based on 
the Convention Against Torture.250 
All three respondents were present in the United States 
unlawfully, but each claimed some form of relief that could cure the 
apparent lack of lawful immigration status and eventually lead to 
permanent residence. After receiving an adverse ruling from the 
immigration judge in his removal proceeding, each respondent filed a 
motion to reopen his case, arguing that his attorney had rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present highly relevant 
evidence or failing to file an appellate brief.251 The three immigration 
judges denied these motions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) affirmed all three.252 
The immigration judges and the BIA all applied the prevailing 
law governing ineffective assistance claims. The regulations on 
motions to reopen require the respondent to offer evidence that “is 
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or 
presented at the former hearing.”253 Ineffective assistance claims can 
 
 245. See In re Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2–3 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (reversing 
Attorney General Mukasey’s order in Compean I). 
 246. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 714–16. 
 247. Id. at 714–15. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 715. 
 250. Id. at 715–16. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2009). 
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satisfy this requirement254 if they fulfill the procedural requirements 
set forth in Matter of Lozada,255 a 1988 decision by the BIA. Lozada 
requires any motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel to 
be supported by documents describing what the prior attorney agreed 
to do, how the noncitizen notified the prior attorney of the 
allegations, and whether the noncitizen filed a complaint with bar 
disciplinary authorities (or why not).256 
Courts vary in their insistence on literal compliance with the 
procedural requirements established by Lozada.257 And immigration 
judges’ decisions to grant or deny motions to reopen for ineffective 
assistance of counsel are heavily fact dependent. But it has become 
broadly accepted that ineffective assistance is a valid basis for a 
motion to reopen, and the right to effective counsel is a matter not 
only of statute and regulation, but also of constitutional due 
process.258 Due process is violated, in the phrasing of an oft-quoted 
decision, when assistance is “so ineffective as to have impinged upon 
the fundamental fairness of the hearing.”259 
This last point about a constitutional basis for a right to effective 
counsel might raise eyebrows, given the absence of a constitutional 
right to any counsel. Coleman v. Thompson,260 a 1991 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, held that if there is no constitutional right to 
appointed counsel in a criminal proceeding, then there is no 
constitutional basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.261 
Did Coleman eliminate any constitutional basis for a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in an immigration proceeding? The 
 
 254. See, e.g., Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel satisfy the [regulations’] general requirement[s] . . . .”). 
 255. In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 256. Id. at 637; see also ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN, MOTOMURA & FULLERTON, supra note 2, at 
1064–77. 
 257. Compare Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While the 
requirements of Lozada are generally reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their 
purpose is fully served by other means.”), and Yang v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 
2007) (holding that ‘‘only . . . substantial compliance is necessary’’), with Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 
498, 501–04 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding the BIA’s denial of an alien’s motion to reopen on 
account of his failure to comply with Lozada). 
 258. See, e.g., Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the immigration 
judge and the BIA had violated an alien’s due process rights by denying his motion to reopen 
his asylum proceeding to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 259. Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Dakane v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2005) (employing functionally identical language). 
 260. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 261. Id. at 752–54. 
MOTOMURA IN FINAL 3/30/2010  6:17:43 AM 
1778 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1723 
government raised this argument unsuccessfully in the case of Matter 
of Assaad.262 In that case, the BIA reasoned that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause supported a different analysis of 
ineffective assistance claims than the Sixth Amendment suggested for 
criminal proceedings.263 Assaad focused on the federal courts of 
appeals’ consistent recognition that noncitizens have “a Fifth 
Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and may 
be denied that right if counsel prevents the respondent from 
meaningfully presenting his or her case.”264 
Those were the general contours of the doctrine when, in the last 
months of the George W. Bush presidency, Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey certified the cases involving Compean, Bangaly, 
and J-E-C- to himself for consolidated review.265 The BIA found for 
the government in all three cases, but Mukasey chose this occasion to, 
as he put it, “review the Board’s position on both the constitutional 
question and the question of how best to resolve an alien’s claim that 
his removal proceeding was prejudiced by his lawyer’s errors.”266 The 
result was his decision in Compean I, issued shortly before President 
Bush left office.267 
Compean I held that “the Constitution does not confer a 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in removal 
proceedings.”268 Noting that several federal appeals courts in the six 
years since Assaad had found no constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings,269 Compean I overruled 
 
 262. In re Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553 (B.I.A. 2003). 
 263. Id. at 560 (declining to overrule Lozada in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Coleman). 
 264. Id. at 558. 
 265. Under the regulations governing the BIA within the Department of Justice, the 
Attorney General may choose to review a BIA decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2008). 
 266. In re Compean (Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 714 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (citing Att’y 
Gen. Order Nos. 2990-2008, 2991-2008 & 2992-2008 (Aug. 7, 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) 
(2008)). 
 267. Attorney General Mukasey handed down his decision on January 7, 2009, less than two 
weeks before Barack Obama acceded to the presidency. 
 268. Id. at 714. 
 269. Id. at 713. At the time of the Compean I decision, federal appellate courts had reached 
divergent outcomes on the matter. Compare Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 
2008) (holding that no such constitutional right exists), Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798–99 
(4th Cir. 2008) (same), and Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (same), with 
Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that such claims are 
constitutionally cognizable), Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600–01 (2d Cir. 2008) (same), Zeru 
v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (same), Fadiga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 
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Lozada and Assaad.270 But Compean I continued: “In extraordinary 
cases, where a lawyer’s deficient performance likely changed the 
outcome of an alien’s removal proceedings, the Board may reopen 
those proceedings notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional 
right to such relief.”271 To reach this result, Mukasey’s reasoning went 
through three main steps. First, deportation is civil, not criminal, so 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is the source of any 
constitutional right to counsel.272 Second, the performance of private 
counsel does not constitute “state action,” which is normally required 
for a due process violation.273 Third, and most directly addressing the 
central issue in the case, the Constitution does not guarantee counsel 
at all, so there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel.274 
In the fifth month of the Obama administration, Attorney 
General Eric Holder vacated his predecessor’s decision.275 Referring 
to the approach in Lozada and Assaad, Holder reasoned that 
Compean I had not “resulted in a thorough consideration of the 
issues involved, particularly for a decision that implemented a new, 
complex framework in place of a well-established and longstanding 
practice that had been reaffirmed by the Board in 2003 after careful 
consideration.”276 Holder then ordered the initiation of rulemaking 
procedures “to evaluate the Lozada framework and to determine 
what modifications should be proposed for public consideration.”277 
Though it is too early to predict the outcome of rulemaking, it is 
significant that Attorney General Holder addressed the substance of 
the issue by repudiating the statement in Compean I that “there is no 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in removal 
 
(3d Cir. 2007) (same), Sene v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 383, 386 (6th Cir. 2006) (same), Dakane v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (same), Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 
1196 (10th Cir. 2003) (same), and Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(same). 
 270. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 712, 727. 
 271. Id. at 714. 
 272. Id. at 716–17. 
 273. Id. at 717–18. 
 274. See id. at 726 (“[T]here is no valid basis for recognizing a constitutional right to counsel 
in removal proceedings, and thus no valid basis for recognizing a constitutional right to effective 
assistance of privately retained lawyers in such proceedings.”). 
 275. In re Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (Att’y Gen. 2009). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
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proceedings.”278 This statement, Holder emphasized, was “not 
necessary either to decide the[] case under [existing law,] or to initiate 
a rulemaking process.”279 More fundamentally, Part IV’s inquiry into 
the right to effective assistance of counsel does not depend on the 
specifics of any rules that may be adopted. My more basic purpose is 
to see how the approach adopted by the BIA and the majority of the 
federal courts of appeals that have addressed the topic sheds light on 
the rights of unauthorized migrants, especially in ways that add to the 
lessons of this Article’s first three Parts. 
B. Assumptions, Institutional Competence, and Citizen Proxies 
The contrast between the two decisions in Compean I and 
Compean II is instructive because Attorney General Mukasey’s 
abrogation of the established law governing ineffective assistance of 
counsel in immigration proceedings—and Attorney General Holder’s 
repudiation of that view and his tentative deference to that set of 
precedents—exposes some key assumptions that underlie the law’s 
response to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. These 
assumptions reflect varying views of the meaning of unlawful 
presence in the United States. 
If many noncitizens without lawful status are allowed to stay in 
the United States through cancellation of removal, waivers of 
inadmissibility and deportability, and other forms of case-by-case 
discretionary relief, then a noncitizen’s lack of lawful status is just the 
beginning of the analysis, not its end. Moreover, the grant or denial of 
such discretionary relief is governed by standards, factors, and other 
markers suggesting that this has become a question of law, at least in 
the sense that deviations from decisions in similar prior cases can 
fairly be called erroneous. If, in turn, unauthorized migrants can 
acquire lawful immigration status through determinations governed 
by legal standards, then the right to effective counsel seems essential 
to outcomes that are fair and just. This is true even if the decision in 
any given case eventually goes against the unauthorized migrant who 
seeks discretionary relief. 
This interpretation of unlawful presence is also the basis for 
questioning the threshold characterization of deportation as civil, not 
criminal. For if there are discernable, enforceable standards that 
 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
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govern the discretionary relief that can effectively legalize 
unauthorized migrants on a case-by-case basis, removing them from 
their homes in the United States seems that much closer to 
punishment. As James Madison once put it, “if a banishment of this 
sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it 
will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be 
applied.”280 This view of removal is bolstered by the growing practice 
of detaining noncitizens placed in removal proceedings, and by court 
decisions recognizing that detention gives rise to rights beyond those 
that attach in removal proceedings.281 
What happens if the opposite assumptions prevail? What if 
unlawful presence is clear and dispositive, in that it dictates the 
ultimate result of the removal proceeding by inevitably forcing the 
noncitizen to leave the United States? And even if ultimate removal 
is not inevitable, what if discretionary relief is an act of grace that is 
not susceptible to correction after comparing the facts, reasoning, and 
outcome with prior cases? If either assumption is correct, then any 
right to effective assistance of counsel is not only less urgent but also 
less grounded in constitutional due process. Moreover, an attorney’s 
persistence seems dilatory rather than a worthy claim of right. 
Contrasting these sets of assumptions reveals some connections 
between the indirect assertion of rights by unauthorized migrants and 
the direct assertion of the right to effective counsel in immigration 
proceedings—at least as it appears in Lozada, Assaad, Compean II, 
and a number of federal appeals court decisions. Importantly, this 
comparison demonstrates that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel can be understood as an institutional competence argument. 
If motions to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel are 
rarely or never granted, then the initial decisions to arrest 
unauthorized migrants and put them into removal proceedings are 
likely to be the only decisions that matter after Congress sets up the 
basic categories for admission and removal. If, however, immigration 
judges are required to be receptive to ineffective assistance claims so 
that attorneys can bring supportable arguments for discretionary 
relief in spite of their apparently unlawful status, then ultimate 
 
 280. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
 281. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (highlighting the “serious 
constitutional problem arising out of a statute that . . . permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, 
deprivation of human liberty”). 
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decisionmaking power will shift away from front-line enforcement 
officers. Put differently, recognizing a right to effective counsel makes 
more meaningful the possibility that initial enforcement decisions will 
be tempered by what happens in immigration court. 
This is a choice between two views of what constitutes 
institutional competence not only in deciding who must leave the 
United States, but even more fundamentally, in deciding what 
unlawful presence means. So viewed, this resembles the contrasting 
approaches to preemption seen in the cases challenging state and 
local laws. City of Hazleton282 is deeply skeptical of enforcement 
decisions by state and local officials in ways that parallel the deep 
skepticism of initial determinations of unlawful presence in the right 
to effective counsel cases.283 
The right to effective counsel can also be understood as a citizen 
proxy argument. Ineffective counsel jeopardizes the interests of the 
U.S. citizens and permanent residents who are close family members 
of the unauthorized migrants whom the government has put into 
removal proceedings. These close relatives are typically the 
individuals whose hardship must be taken into account as part of the 
decision on discretionary relief. For potentially viable claims of 
unauthorized migrants to be cut off without being presented with the 
assistance of competent counsel is to harm these citizens and 
permanent residents. This is the same indirect assertion of 
unauthorized migrants’ rights shown to be effective in the workplace 
protection and search and seizure contexts. 
CONCLUSION: TWILIGHT AMERICANS? 
What emerges from these inquiries into four areas in which the 
rights of unauthorized migrants are contested? Why does any of this 
matter? To answer these questions, I start by drawing one obvious 
conclusion from this Article’s four inquiries. In spite of their position 
outside the law, unauthorized migrants do have rights in some 
significant respects. They can claim partial or indirect rights in four 
important areas in which the ability to claim rights can matter a great 
deal. Unauthorized migrants are integrated into the U.S. legal system, 
but often their rights can be asserted only obliquely or indirectly. 
 
 282. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, No. 07-3531 
(3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008); see also supra Part I. 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92. 
MOTOMORA IN FINAL 3/30/2010  6:17:43 AM 
2010] THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 1783 
The four topics reveal five recurring and intertwined patterns. 
Some rights can be vindicated only if unauthorized migrants can 
either (1) question a government decisionmaker’s institutional 
competence, (2) identify wrongdoers who are more culpable than the 
unauthorized migrants, (3) identify citizen proxies, (4) invoke 
procedural surrogates, or (5) invoke phantom norms. These five 
patterns are not necessarily widespread, but they have emerged 
enough to suggest reasoning and modes of argument that may 
persuade many judges in many cases, especially if pressed by 
advocates on facts that a particular judge finds sympathetic. 
Second, these patterns of indirect or oblique rights are consistent 
with a national ambivalence toward immigration outside the law. 
Much of Justice Brennan’s reasoning in Plyler was directed toward 
complicating the meaning of unlawful presence. According to his 
view, illegality is difficult to establish, and even noncitizens lacking an 
avenue to lawful status might never be removed from the United 
States. By definition, unauthorized migrants are in the United States 
in violation of the law, and yet immigration law enforcement in the 
United States—as it was when Brennan wrote one generation ago—
still reflects widespread tolerance of immigration outside the law. 
This is the knowing and perhaps intentional consequence of 
government policy. In this setting, the U.S. legal system recognizes 
that unauthorized migrants cannot be relegated to true oblivion. 
During oral argument in Plyler, Justice Thurgood Marshall asked 
the attorney for the state of Texas, John Hardy, whether Texas could 
deny fire protection to illegal aliens.284 Apparently nonplussed, Hardy 
bought a little time: “Deny them fire protection?” Marshall persisted: 
“Yes, sir. F-I-R-E. . . . Could Texas pass a law and say they cannot be 
protected?” When Hardy said that he didn’t think it could, Marshall 
pressed on: “Why not? . . . Somebody’s house is more important than 
his child?”285 
National ambivalence toward immigration outside the law poses 
some hard choices about legal protections for unauthorized migrants. 
What is like fire protection and what is not? Just as national policy 
 
 284. See Barbara Belejack, A Lesson in Equal Protection: The Texas Cases that Opened the 
Schoolhouse Door to Undocumented Immigrant Children, TEX. OBSERVER, July 12, 2007, 
http://www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=2548; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (No. 80-1538), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-
1989/1981/1981_80_1538/argument. 
 285. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 284. 
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allows unauthorized migrants to live and work in the United States, 
the legal system sometimes affords them remedies for maltreatment 
by state and local governments, for employer wrongdoing, for illegal 
law enforcement activity, and for ineffective representation in 
immigration court. And yet, in the same way that unauthorized 
migrants live under the threat of discretionary government decisions 
that could lead to their deportation, the legal system circumscribes 
and channels their legal rights claims. Does de facto national policy 
on immigration outside the law cause these patterns of oblique or 
conditional rights? It is hard to build a convincing case for causation. 
But it is safe to say that these patterns are generally consistent with 
U.S. immigration policy. 
Third, these patterns of oblique rights are related to each other. 
A major purpose of this Article has been to map these connections 
for the first time. For example, the trend toward institutional 
competence and away from individual rights claims is consistent with 
the emergence of interest surrogates in the form of citizen proxy 
arguments in the workplace law context. Both citizen proxy 
arguments and institutional competence arguments reflect greater 
reliance on process, especially on transparency and on the dialogue 
that transparency may enable or foster. This may mean a shift of 
advocacy and responsibility from court litigation to the political 
branches. It may also initiate a shift in the debate from state and local 
governments to the federal government. 
Fourth, these patterns suggest relationships—both doctrinal and 
strategic—between various types of arguments to challenge 
government decisionmaking. The relationships suggested by these 
patterns shift significantly away from the relationships that prevail 
when citizens challenge the government. Unauthorized migrants are 
vulnerable to racial or ethnic discrimination masked by laws that are 
facially neutral as to race or ethnicity, yet may have been enacted by a 
city council that was quite aware that to target noncitizens based on 
immigration law status—which the U.S. Constitution allows outside 
of public K–12 education—would be to target a population that is 
racially or ethnically different. The challenge that is most likely to 
invalidate such a local decision is not equal protection, but 
preemption. 
In addition to shifts in doctrinal relationships that concern race 
and ethnicity, the patterns discussed in this Article suggest that 
similar shifts in other aspects of doctrine are putting advocates and 
decisionmakers to complex choices. In the workplace context, for 
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example, the key to litigation success is identifying wrongdoers who 
are more culpable than the unauthorized worker or U.S. citizens who 
will be harmed if the unauthorized worker wins an inadequate 
remedy. But this shift diverts attention away from the factors that 
might help decide whether unauthorized migrants deserve more 
direct recognition of their individual rights, without the workarounds 
that have become part of judicial decisions and litigation strategies. 
These patterns of oblique rights shift debate away from the moral 
argument for and against recognition of unauthorized migrants as 
individuals and as a group of unauthorized migrants. Instead, debate 
shifts toward viewing the unauthorized simply through the pragmatic 
prism of asking: How will what happens to “them” affect “us”? But it 
should not be surprising that this is precisely how the role of 
unauthorized migrants in U.S. society—though the formal law would 
deny their presence—reemerges as legal argument. 
A final thought comes back to this Article’s central thesis—that 
the rights of unauthorized migrants have evolved in certain patterns 
that reflect various aspects of a pervasive national ambivalence about 
immigration outside the law. The current impasse—not only with 
regard to what to do about immigration outside the law, but also with 
regard to how to even think about it—has many costs. Chief among 
these costs are serious impediments to addressing major challenges 
and opportunities that come with being a nation of immigrants. These 
challenges and opportunities include three foundational questions 
that I have addressed elsewhere.286 I mention them here as a frame for 
learning from this Article’s inquiry into the rights of these others. 
One question is how to define immigration enforcement to 
reflect the sensitive exercise of discretion and to recognize that the 
line between legal and illegal immigration is not—and has never 
been—clear and impermeable. The second question is how to foster 
the growth of communities that can meaningfully integrate both 
citizens and noncitizens, including some unauthorized migrants. The 
third question is how to honor any obligations and expectations that 
emerge from the complex historical origins of immigration outside 
the law, and yet to also move forward in the national interest. 
Answering these questions is essential if national policy is to 
achieve a measure of justice in immigration, where this aspiration is 
especially elusive because the very idea of citizenship presupposes 
 
 286. See Motomura, supra note 2. 
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some inequality between citizens and noncitizens. There are many 
obstacles that stand between the status quo and a just immigration 
policy. One major obstacle is the reality that unauthorized migrants 
are twilight Americans, with the indirect and oblique rights that this 
Article has analyzed. At the same time, as long as impasse persists in 
public debate about immigration outside the law, these patterns of 
oblique rights may be the inevitable consequence. 
